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Essay: Power and Presumptions; Rules and 
Rhetoric; Institutions and Indian Law* 
Deborah A. Geier** 
"Pequot Indians' Casino Wealth Extends the Reach of 
Tribal Law,"' the headline read. The article described how the  
Mashantucket Pequots, a tiny Connecticut tribe, has enacted 
new laws and expanded its court system with the newly 
acquired wealth realized from the operation of its Foxwood 
Casino in Ledyard, Connecticut. "The point of all this, tribal 
officials say, is not the law for its own sake, but rather what 
the ability to make and enforce laws implies: authority, 
independence and s ~ v e r e i g n t ~ . " ~  
Precisely what laws are  within a tribe's sovereign power to 
enact and enforce within the  boundaries of Indian country3 is 
* COPYRIGHT 1994 DEBORAH A. GEIER 
** Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland 
State University. J.D., 1986, Case Western Reserve School of Law; A.B., 1983 
Baldwin-Wallace College. I thank Professor Gregory Mark for his helpful comments 
on an earlier draft as well as Eric Spade for his research assistance. 
I think it particularly appropriate that this piece is published in the BYU Law 
Review. My interest in Indian law was sparked during my clerkship with the 
Honorable Monroe G. McKay of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, who was a 
member of the BYU faculty when named to the federal bench. Indian law issues 
remain close to his heart, and his enthusiasm for the area was infectious. That is 
not to say, however, that he would agree with parts--or even any--of what is 
written here. 
1. Kirk Johnson, Pequot Indians' Casino Wealth Extends the Reach of Tribal 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, at  1. 
2. Id. at 32. 
3. "Indian country" is a term of art in Indian law. Originally an undefined 
term appearing in early statutes and interpreted in a series of Supreme Court 
opinions, the term was most recently statutorily defined in 1948. In that definition, 
Congress adopted much of the common law that had developed. Included within 
the term are Indian reservations, including fee-patented lands within a reservation, 
as well as "dependent Indian communities" and allotments held by individual 
Indians, wherever located. 18 U.S.C. 8 1151 (1988); infra note 12 (describing 
allotments). While the statutory definition appears within a statute dealing only 
with criminal jurisdiction, the definition has been applied generally to questions of 
civil jurisdiction as well. See, e g . ,  Oklahoma Tax Cornm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 
452 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
not a simple question. The intimately related question-what 
laws are within a state's sovereign power to enact and enforce 
within the boundaries of Indian country within a state-is 
equally thorny. 
In  general, "sovereignty" means the political power to 
govern a people in a geographic territory through the rule of 
law. The "sovereignty" exercised by Indian tribes in this 
country is not so easily defined. The Constitution does not 
define it; instead, it is defined by an ever-evolving patchwork of 
treaties, statutes, and, most notably in the modern era, 
Supreme Court common-law decisions that allocate political 
power among the federal government, states, and tribes. Its 
contours thus remain fluid instead of fixed, ambiguous instead 
of clear. 
Many commentators have critiqued the substance of tribal 
sovereignty that has emerged from the panoply of statutes and 
Supreme Court decisionsO4 Intimately related to substance, 
however, is the process creating the substance, and I seek 
rather to focus on that process. The precise contours and 
content of tribal sovereignty today are inevitably a function of 
the decision-making process that defines it, and I argue that 
the process through which the concept of tribal sovereignty is 
given meaning today is fundamentally flawed. 
I first describe the institutional process by which tribal 
sovereignty is defined. Though the Supreme Court has decided 
that Congress possesses plenary power to define tribal 
sovereignty, the Court has assumed a pivotal role in the 
modern era of defining tribal sovereignty in those large areas 
in which Congress has failed to speak. When the Supreme 
Court is the decision-maker, its decision-making process has 
two components that need to be teased out: the institutional 
component of that process (the unique relationship between 
Congress and the Supreme Court in this context) and the 
rhetorical component of the process (the language used in 
113 S. Ct. 1985, 1991 (1993) (citing the definition of Indian country in $ 1151 in a 
civil tax case); DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) 
("While $ 1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court 
has recognized that it generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction."); 
see also FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDROOK OF FEDERAL 1NL)IAN LAW 27-46 ( R e ~ a r d  
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
4. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based [sic] and Membership- 
Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 
55 U. PITI'. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
INDIAN LAW 
Supreme Court decisions in which tribal sovereignty is shaped). 
I show how each of these components feeds upon the other in a 
circularity peculiar to Indian law. The Court's language and 
rhetorical devices in deciding the contours of tribal sovereignty 
in these common-law cases invoke Congress as the institution 
responsible for the case's outcome. That circularity produces 
two ill effects: It clouds the institutional responsibility for the 
decision, and it allows the Court to avoid discussing openly, 
explicitly, and coherently the real heart of the matter-what 
tribal sovereignty should be. 
I argue that the Supreme Court has implicitly used a 
specific rhetorical device in its common-law decisions to shape 
the substance of tribal sovereignty, in part to avoid the difficult 
inquiries inherent in a frank and full discussion of tribal 
sovereignty. Richard H. Gaskins calls this rhetorical device the 
"argument-from-ignorance,'" which employs the use of 
presumptions and burdens of proof to define substance in the 
face of indeterminacy. This use of presumptions and burdens of 
proof is different from the more traditional use of these devices 
as benign expedients in the evidentiary process. The use of the 
"argument-from-ignorance" in the Supreme Court's Indian law 
jurisprudence also allows a third ill effect into the process: The 
Court can and does fundamentally change the substantive law 
without appearing to do so. Without the appearance of change, 
the Court's opinions need not proffer any defense or rationale 
for the change. The balance of power in Indian country can 
thus be shifted dramatically without explicit and reasoned 
justifications solely through switching the presumptions 
underlying the outcome. 
To illustrate, I trace the common-law presumptions in 
place before 1989 that favored tribal power over state power in 
the civil regulatory context when transactions occurred in 
Indian country and were intimately related to the land, the 
geographic component of sovereignty. I then expose the 
fundamental, yet implicit, change in the Supreme Court's 
threshold presumptions when analyzing the scope of tribal 
sovereignty in civil regulatory jurisdiction. This change occured 
in two 1989 cases: Cotton Petroleum Corp. u. New ~ e x i c o ~  and
5. RICHARD H. GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE (1992). 
Though he does not address the use of the device in Indian law, I believe the 
material that follows shows how well the shoe fits. 
6. 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
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Brendale u. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian 
N a t i ~ n . ~  Cotton Petroleum dealt with the sphere of state 
regulatory power in Indian country over non-Indians, and 
Brendale dealt with the sphere of tribal regulatory power in 
Indian country over non-Indians. Both dealt with issues and 
transactions closely tied to the land. The clash between tribal 
and state sovereignty in the area of civil regulatory 
jurisdiction-including the power to tax, to regulate the 
environment, and to regulate land use-is a prime issue as we 
enter the next century? Thus, the impact of those two cases 
and the presumptions they memorialize is far-reaching. 
Contrary to  stated federal policy, the Supreme Court shifted 
power from tribal governments to states in these two land- 
related cases, and it did so by reversing the implicit 
presumptions used by the Court in delineating the boundaries 
between state and tribal power. 
I can offer no easy answers t o  solve the problems of process 
described here. Though I offer some thoughts in that direction, 
my prime purpose is to make explicit both the weaknesses of 
the current decision-making apparatus-the process-and the 
inexorable and negative impact that this flawed process has on 
the coherent and conscious development of the substance of the 
law regarding the scope and content of tribal sovereignty. 
7. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
8. President Clinton has indicated support for tribal sovereignty. See 
Memorandum of April 29, 1994, Government-to-Government Relations with Native 
American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1994) ("I am strongly 
committed to building a more effective day-to-day working relationship reflecting 
respect for the rights of self-government due the sovereign tribal governments."). 
Yet, the real tension today lies between the state and tribes in their desire to tax 
and regulate in Indian country. Unless the President's views are translated into 
legislation favoring tribal power over state power in this context, the resolution of 
this tension will continue to be in the hands of the Supreme Court, as  described 
more hl ly in Part 11. 
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11. WHO DECIDES THE MEANING OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY? 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution confers 
upon Congress the power "to regulate commerce . . . with the 
Indian tribes." Perhaps combined with the war power and 
treaty power, the Indian Commerce Clause has been construed 
by the Supreme Court as vesting "plenary power" in Congress 
to regulate Indian tribes and their land. The power of Congress 
to recognize, develop, or even destroy the political status of 
tribes is today unquestioned by the Court, though by no means 
unquestioned by academics.' As phrased by the Court, "The 
sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and 
limited character. It exists only a t  the sufferance of Congress 
and is subject to complete defeasance."1° As one commentator 
has phrased it, the tribes possess only "sovereignty of 
sufferance, oxymoronic on its face."" Virtually no action taken 
by Congress-even "termination" of the special t rust  
relationship between a tribe and the federal government, 
resulting in effective "termination" of the political power of the 
9. Two of the best and often-cited discussions of the plenary-power doctrine 
are Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984), and Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, 
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3, 46-59. For an illuminating colloquy 
on the virtues and vices of the plenary-power doctrine, see Robert Laurence, 
Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 
ARE. L. REV. 413 (1988); Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, the Designated 
Hitter Rule and "The Actual State of Things," 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 459 (1988); Robert 
A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. 
L. REV. 219; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Leaning Not to Live With Eurocentric 
Myopia, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439 (1988). 
10. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). This phrase was 
quoted approvingly in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719 (1983), and Duro v. 
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 699 (1990) ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting). In Rice, the last clause 
was italicized for emphasis. 
11. Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on 
Constitutional Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 409 (1992). 
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tribe12-has been held by the Court to be unlawful as outside 
12. The "termination era" embodied but one of the several pendulum swings 
between the extremes of assimilation on the one hand and the promotion of tribal 
sovereignty on the other in the last two centuries. The following brief synopsis is 
extracted from DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 83-285 (3d ed. 
1993). 
The removal era, generally 1830 to 1850, saw the forced migration of tribes to 
a vast unorganized territory west of the Mississippi that came to be known as 
"Indian Territory." Around 1850, with white hunger for land pressing westward, 
the reservation system as we now think of it evolved. Even these reservations 
proved to be too tempting for land-hungry whites, however, leading to the 
allotment era. 
The practice of allotment began with tribe-specific statutes that broke up the 
tribally owned reservation, awarded individual plots of land to Indians, and opened 
up huge tracts of remaining reservation land to white settlers. The practice finally 
led to the enactment in 1887 of the General Allotment Act, known as the Dawes 
Act, which formalized the policy of assimilation for all tribes. The policy was 
supported by an unusual coalition of those in the western portion of the country 
who desired the land and those easterners who believed that it was their duty to 
christianize and civilize the Indians, a task that they considered could not be 
accomplished until tribalism was destroyed and assimilation of Indians into the 
mainstream culture achieved. 
The allotment program was a miserable failure, resulting in a pendulum swing 
in Indian policy with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. It halted the further 
allotment of Indian land, provided a mechanism to reacquire some lost land, and 
established a mechanism for tribes to adopt self-governance on Indian reservations. 
"The purpose [of the Act] was to promote tribal sovereignty and to stop the 
disintegration of the Indian land mass, which decreased from 138 million acres 
prior to the allotment program to 48 million acres." Deborah A. Geier, 
Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445, 450 11.32 (1993). 
The pendulum swung back to assimilation in the early 1950s. Perhaps 
tribalism was seen to be too close to communism to be comfortable, or perhaps 
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (19551, had an inchoate effect on 
Indian policy. See Erik M. Jensen, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native 
Societies in a Modern Constitutional Democracy, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 318, 327 
(1987) (reviewing book of same title by Charles F. Wilkinson); Erik M. Jensen, 
Monroe G. McKay and American Indian Law: In Honor of Judge McKay's Tenth 
Anniversary on the Federal Bench, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1103 (both pieces seeking a 
philosophical justification consistent with the moral principles of Brown for the 
Indian policy of measured separatism). In any event, the era of "termination and 
relocation" resulted in the termination of the special trust relationship between the 
federal government and several tribes and the relocation of Indians of other tribes, 
through the enticement of cash grants, from reservations to certain urban centers. 
The next pendulum swing in Indian policy-that toward "self- 
determinationn--came in the 1960s and remains extant as the official federal 
policy. An explicit, though admittedly often unfulfilled, policy of each Congress in 
the last 30 years has been the strengthening of tribal governments, the protection 
of tribal culture, the encouragement of tribal economic self-sufficiency, and the 
promotion of tribal self-determination or autonomy. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act 
of 1974, 25 U.S.C. 5 1451-1534 (1988); Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. $$ 450-450n (1988). Cf. Statement on Indian 
Policy, PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983) (recounting President Reagan's pledge to 
"assist tribes in strengthening their governments by removing federal impediments 
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of the power of Congress.13 
Congress therefore possesses the authority t o  define the 
explicit lines between the extent and scope of state power in 
Indian country, the extent and scope of tribal power over 
nonmembers in Indian country, and the extent and scope of 
federal power in Indian country. In a patchwork of statutes 
covering specific matters, such as criminal jurisdiction, 
Congress sometimes does draw explicit lines.14 When the 
Court is then presented with a dispute that involves one of 
these statutes, each Justice's approach to the issue reflects his 
or her approach to statutory interpretation in general. Canons 
of statutory and treaty interpretation favor resolving 
ambiguities in favor of the Indians,15 but in general, 
principles of Indian law statutory interpretation are merely a 
subset of the larger and more familiar body of principles 
governing standard statutory interpretation? Thus, 
disagreements among the Justices regardmg interpretation of 
Indian statutory law stem from basic disagreements regarding 
fundamental rules of statutory interpretation, for example 
to tribal self-government and tribal resource development"). 
13. "The Court has never held a congressional exercise of power over Indian 
tribes to be illegal, and there is no reason to think it ever will." Ball, supra note 
9, at 12. 
Only positive constitutional commands that apply to all, such as the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, appear to constrain the manner in which Congress 
exercises its plenary power in the field of Indian law. See United States v. Sioux 
Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 407-24 (1980) (holding that although Congress can abrogate 
Indian treaties unilaterally by taking land in contravention of a treaty, such taking 
is subject to the just-compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment). But see Tee- 
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-91 (1955) (holding the taking 
of land held under "aboriginal title," i.e., land that was never formally set aside by 
treaty or statute for the natives, does not require compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment). 
14. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codiFied as 
amended at  18 U.S.C. $3 1161-1162 (19881, 25 U.S.C. $$ 1321-1322 (1988), 28 
U.S.C. 0 1360 (1988)) [hereinafter Public Law 2801 (speclfymg that some states 
must and others may assume criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country); 
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. $ 1152 (1988) (providing for federal 
jurisdiction over certain crimes in Indian country); Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 
1153 (1988) (providing for federal jurisdiction over certain crimes in Indian 
country). 
15. See GETCHES, supra note 12, at 345-48. 
16. But see David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: 
Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA.  L. REV. 403, 
405 (1994) ("Because they fail to address the tribes' unique histories, general 
theories of statutory interpretation offer little help in constructing a theory of 
interpretation for federal Indian statutes."). 
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whether or not to consult extra-textual tools to glean the 
meaning of a statute. 
That situation-when there is a specific and detailed 
statute that explicitly purports to resolve the dispute before the 
Court-is not what this Essay addresses.'? Many disputes 
that come before the Court present a question regarding the 
line between state and tribal power that is not squarely 
addressed by any statute, let alone answered. There may be 
general treaty terms, perhaps a statute dealing with the 
general subject matter though not one squarely applicable, but 
there is no source of law that directly purports to answer the 
question of, for example, whether an Indian living and working 
on a reservation is subject to a state income tax? As the 
Court must resolve the dispute before it, what is its role as 
"gap filler7' in these instances? 
The Court has created a vast body of Indian common 
law1' to resolve these disputes, any decision of which could be 
overturned by Congress under its plenary power over Indian 
affairs. While Congress does occasionally reverse or modify the 
outcomes of these common-law cases,20 it seems in the past to 
have been generally content with letting the Supreme Court 
craft, through the common law, the boundaries between state 
and tribal power not specifically addressed by statute. There is 
no powerful and vocal constituency in Congress to solidify and 
expand tribal power and to limit state power in Indian country, 
17. A recent example of such an Indian law case that demonstrates both the 
usual tensions in statutory interpretation as well as the recent tendency to rule 
against the Indians is County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). For a discussion of the case within 
the context of Justice Scalia's brand of textualism, see Geier, supra note 12, at  450 
11.32. See generally Philip P.  Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and 
the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990) 
(discussing statutory cases as well as common-law cases). 
18. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (holding 
that McClanahan's wages were not subject to state income taxation). 
19. By "Indian law," I generally mean the "body of jurisprudence . . . defining 
and implementing the relationship among the United States, Indian tribes . . . , 
and the states." COHEN, supra note 3, at  1. 
20. For example, Congress overturned the result in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 
676 (1990), which held that a tribe possesses no criminal jurisdiction over Indians 
who are not enrolled members of the tribe. Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 
(1991). Similarly, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 
$5 2702-272 1 (1988), which allows but regulates Indian gambling activities, in 
response to the Court's decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
480 U.S. 202 (1987)' which confirmed the right of the tribes in the case to engage 
in reservation gambling activities free of state regulation. 
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not uncommon outcomes of pre-1989 Indian law court cases. 
Congress might have wished to let the Court do what might be 
difficult to accomplish on Capitol Hill in view of the power of 
the numerous states that contain reservations-states whose 
interests in Indian affairs are often inimical to the expansion of 
tribal power a t  the expense of state power-and the lack of a 
countervailing power in the tribal constituency. 
As more fully traced in Part 111, the rhetorical device 
underlying these common law decisions in the modern era is 
the use of presumptions in the face of indeterminacy. 
Presumptions and burdens of proof in the law have long 
been perceived as merely mundane matters of evidence and 
procedure, affecting substantive outcomes, surely, but not 
depending upon the substance of particular disputes for their 
legitimacy. Presumptions and burdens of proof, whether 
legislative in origin or judge-made, have been viewed as fairly 
innocuous devices based on notions of "convenience, fairness, 
a n d  policy."21 As the  Supreme Cour t  phrased  i t ,  
"[p]resumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing 
circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another, 
is rendered difficult. . . . Arising out of considerations of 
fairness, public policy, and probability, as  well as judicial 
economy, presumptions are also useful devices for allocating 
the burdens of proof between par tie^."^" 
Writing in 1931, Edmund Morgan observed that "[tlhere 
are but few presumptions which are invented for the sole 
purpose of reaching what the courts deem a socially desirable 
result."23 Even Morgan, however, recognized that  "[ilt is now 
common learning that the common-law judges have made 
extensive use of the device of presumptions for two purposes: to 
control the jury in its function of fact finding, and to change the 
21. Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 65 (1961). 
22. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988). 
What is likely, for instance, is often presumed. Most men are sane, as the 
law reckons sanity, and most properly sent letters reach their destination. 
In the absence of any evidence pointing to an opposite conclusion in the 
case at hand, it is both convenient and fair to assume that this testator, 
or this man accused of crime was sane when he made the will or did the 
act charged as criminal; or that this properly mailed letter reached the 
addressee. 
James, supra note 21, at 65-66 (footnotes omitted). 
23. Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 
HARv. L. REV. 906, 930 (1931). 
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accepted rules of the common law without the appearance of 
judicial legi~lation."~~ 
The substantive impact of presumptions and burdens of 
proof as well as the role of courts in  shaping them have come 
under increasing scrutiny since Morgan's era. In  his book 
melding law and rhetoric, Richard H. Gaskins argues that  a n  
argument strategy born in the legal arena and reaching 
preeminence in the Warren Court era has been appropriated as 
a common rhetorical device in public discourse of every sort.25 
He describes the "pervasive" but "hidden role of arguments- 
from-ignorance"26 that  employ "the skillful shifting of 
customary proof  burden^."^' 
The argument-from-ignorance is widely distributed across the 
rhetorical landscape. Its general pattern is an affirmative 
inference from the lack of knowledge. In order to work as  an 
argument, i t  requires some kind of decision rule (usually 
unstated) about how the parties t o  a discussion should 
proceed in the face of uncertainty or indeterminacy.28 
With respect to the field of constitutional law, for example, 
Gaskins observes: 
[Ilt makes an enormous difference who bears the burden of 
proof on constitutional questions: whether i t  is  the 
government that must show how its actions are constitutional 
or the challenger that must show how they are not. This 
choice is critical, since the degree of proof required can be set 
so high in either case that it is virtually impossible to 
meet.29 
The common law evolution in  Indian law described in Part 
I11 provides a powerful example of Gaskins's argument-from- 
ignorance in that  the Court is working in a n  area in  which 
Congress, which has the power to decide the issue, is 
essentially silent. The presumptions crafted by the Court in the 
face of indeterminacy decide outcome, and a switch in  
24. Id. at 909 (emphasis added). 
25. GASKINS, supra note 5; see also Volume 17, issue 3, HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y (1994) (symposium issue, precipitated by Gaskins' book, on presumptions and 
burdens of proof). 
26. GASKINS, supra note 5, at xiv. 
27. Id. at 48. 
28. Id. at xv. 
29. Id. at 54. 
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presumptions evidences a fundamental alteration i n  
substance-in this context, a fundamental change in the 
relative scopes of state and tribal power. 
A. The Sphere of State Power in Indian Country 
The foundation for the development of the common law 
pertaining to the scope of authority of state law in Indian coun- 
try is Chief Justice John Marshall's opinions in the Cherokee 
cases: Cherokee Nation u. Georgia3' and Worcester v. Geor- 
g i ~ . ~ '  While much can be said about those cases,s2 the impor- 
tant point for our purposes is that Worcester held that 
Georgia's laws had no effect in Indian country, even with re- 
spect to non-Indians residing there.33 Justice Marshall con- 
cluded that the Federal government had recognized, through 
treaties, the Indian nations as "distinct political communities, 
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is 
excl~sive."~~ Because under the Supremacy Clause the states 
could not supersede the Federal government's authority, the 
states could not exercise sovereignty in Indian country. 
Much of the subsequent common-law development of Indi- 
an  law regarding the relative scopes of state and tribal power 
has occurred in the modern era. Charles F. Wilkinson begins 
his book, American Indians, Time, and the Law, with the asser- 
tion that the modem era of federal Indian law was introduced 
in 1959, a t  the cusp of the Indian policy of self-determina- 
t i ~ n , ~ ~  with the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. 
Lee.36 In that watershed case of humble facts, the Court decid- 
30. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
31. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 
(1823) (dealing with Indian land title), completes Justice Marshall's trilogy of cases 
providing the foundations of Indian law. 
32. "The Cherokee cases were the central fury of what was, by all accounts, 
one of the greatest constitutional crises in the history of the nation." GETCHES, 
supra note 12, at  128 (citations omitted). For a brief historical background sur- 
rounding the cases, see id. at  122-30 and 137-39, and for a more probing analysis 
of the cases themselves, see Ball, supra note 9, at  20-43. 
33. Worcester involved the criminal conviction of Worcester and six other mis- 
sionaries who violated a Georgia law requiring all nodndians residing in Cherokee 
Country to obtain a license from the governor. He was sentenced to four years of 
hard labor. 
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557. 
35. See supra note 12 (briefly describing eras in Indian policy). 
36. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, 
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ed that a non-Indian merchant doing business on the Navajo 
reservation could not bring a civil suit in Arizona state court 
against a Navajo who failed to  pay his installment loan. The 
Court concluded that only the Navajo courts had jurisdiction to 
hear the dispute,s7 though the Court did not rely on any con- 
gressional statute in requiring that result.3s 
That result was truly startling. If the defendant had been 
literally anyone else in the world other than an Indian residing 
on a reservation, the state court would have had subject matter 
jurisdiction t o  hear the case. 
An action on a contract is normally a transitory cause of ac- 
tion that can be brought to suit in a forum other than the one 
in which the contract was executed. Thus a contract made in 
another state, or even a foreign country, would be within the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Apache County Superior 
Court. The rule in Williams, however, requires that the case 
be heard exclusively within the tribal system in order to pro- 
mote and protect tribal self-g~vernment.~' 
Out of that obscure installment loan transaction and the six- 
paragraph opinion dealing with it arose the modern body of 
judicially created law that fills the large vacuum that Congress 
has left in defining the sphere of state power over activities 
occurring in Indian country. 
TIME, AND THE LAW 1 (1987). 
37. 358 U.S. at 222-23. 
38. Public Law 280, supra note 14, was enacted in 1953, and the Court could 
simply have cited that law to reach the same result. That law provides that cer- 
tain states, Arizona not included, must accept criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
crimes and disputes arising in Indian country. Other states could assume such 
jurisdiction after following the appropriate procedures. Arizona did not choose to do 
so. The Court in Williams v. Lee could simply have cited the failure of Arizona to 
assume civil jurisdiction under the terms of the statute as the reason why the 
state had no such jurisdiction and thus could not open its courts to the dispute. 
While the Court did refer in passing to the statute, see 358 U.S. at 222-23, it 
clearly was not the basis for the decision. See Robert Laurence, The Indian Com- 
merce Clause, 23 ARE. L. REV. 203, 233 n.239 (1981). 
Public Law 280 was construed in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), 
to apply only to civil court jurisdiction, not to civil regulatory jurisdiction. Thus, 
Public Law 280 states have jurisdiction to hear civil cases arising in Indian coun- 
try but do not necessarily have the power to regulate in Indian country. The power 
to  tax and regulate is not the subject of any general congressional statute, though 
some specific civil matters are addressed. See, e.g., The Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Ad, supra note 20; The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. $5 1901-1963 
(1988). Thus, the scope of the civil power of states to tax and regulate in Indian 
country has been largely relegated to common-law development. 
39. WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 1. 
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The result in Williams u. Lee was not the result of a simple 
application of the Worcester rule that state law had no effect 
with respect to  activities occurring in Indian country. Rather, 
the Court in Williams u. Lee required an analysis not undertak- 
en by the Worcester Court: "Essentially, absent governing Acts 
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state 
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them."40 Thus, contrary t o  the 
implications of Worcester, in the face of congressional silence, 
some state authority in Indian country may not be struck down 
by the Court under modern analysis. Nevertheless, the lan- 
guage of Williams u. Lee focused forthrightly on the central 
issue: the scope of tribal sovereignty t o  make law. Out of Wil- 
liams u. Lee's respect for tribal sovereignty grew a body of com- 
mon law that was relatively solicitous of assertions of tribal 
power over Indian country activities, whether pertaining t o  
Indians or non-Indians, and relatively unreceptive t o  assertions 
of state power over activities in Indian country. 
The language focusing on tribal sovereignty in Williams u. 
Lee held the potential for the Court to  craft the contours of 
tribal sovereignty in an open and explicit fashion, discussing 
outright the underlying tensions and questions that drive the 
definition. The Court later replaced the Williams u. Lee sover- 
eignty approach of measuring the scope of state authority in 
Indian country, however, with a "preemption" analysis, first 
introduced in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax  omm mission^^ 
in 1973 and nominally remaining the controlling test today 
under the common-law inquiry.42 The adoption of that test 
40. 358 US. at 220. 
41. 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (disallowing state income taxation of wages earned by 
an Indian on a reservation). 
42. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), 
Court maintained that the sovereignty analysis of Williams v. Lee remained 
independent ground, in addition to preemption, for striking down state law. 
The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a 
sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken 
on the reservation or by tribal members. They are related, however, in 
two important ways. The right of tribal self-government is ultimately 
dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even so, tradi- 
tional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply ingrained in our 
jurisprudence that they have provided an important "backdrop" against 
which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured. 
the 
an 
Id. at 143 (citation omitted). But the Court's rhetoric has not been borne out by its 
decisions. Preemption has since remained the sole tool by which the Court has 
measured state power in Indian country. 
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and its application over the years shifted the inquiry away 
from frank and difficult discussions of the scope of tribal sover- 
eignty. 
Preemption, in general, 
is  a constitutional doctrine that permits Congress to oust all 
or some state authority in subject matter areas where states 
have authority to legislate absent federal action. . . . In each 
case the state or local law would have been a valid exercise of 
the police power but for the terms or intent of federal legisla- 
tion which conflicted with the state law o r  which was so com- 
prehensive as to occupy the field. Federal preemption, of 
course, is based on the exercise of constitutional authority 
(often but not always the Commerce Clause) coupled with the 
Supremacy Clause of article VI, clause 2.43 
\ 
In  Indian law, preemption of state law is driven by congressio- 
nal authority under the Indian Commerce Clause coupled with 
the Supremacy Clause. 
Merely invoking the word "preemption" and inquiring 
whether state law is preempted by the interests of the federal 
government on behalf of the tribes leaves several questions 
unresolved regarding precisely how the doctrine is to be ap- 
plied. Congress is silent on this issue. Thus, the Supreme Court 
relies on the argument-from-ignorance in the face of the inde- 
terminacy left them by Congress, and the choice of presump- 
tions selected by the Justices is crucial to outcome. The Justic- 
es must choose between two antipodal presumptions when 
creating the resulting common law: Should we presume that 
state law is  invalid (preempted) absent express authorization by 
Congress that state law should have effect, or should we pre- 
sume that state law is valid (not preempted) unless implicitly or 
explicitly prohibited by Congress? That is, must Congress act to 
extend state law to the transaction a t  issue, or must Congress 
act to grant tribes an immunity from state law to the transac- 
tion at issue? 
The choice between these two diametrically opposed pre- 
sumptions is decisive. By definition, there is no statutory or 
treaty authority purporting to address the precise exercise of 
state action a t  issue, or else the common-law approach need 
not be invoked. In most cases only vague treaty terms or sim- 
ply the bald fact that Congress set aside the reservation for the 
43. GETCHES, supra note 12, at 453. 
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Indians is the sole federal authority that the Court must con- 
sult in determining whether state law is ~reempted.4~ Such 
authority, obviously, is no help a t  all. The presumption the 
Justices bring to the inquiry is therefore outcome-determina- 
tive. If one presumes that Congress must act to grant an im- 
munity or exemption from state law, state law will be held to 
apply. If one presumes that Congress must act to extend state 
law to the transaction, state law will be held inapplicable. 
What should inform which presumption controls? The 
Court in  these common-law cases is ostensibly acting as a sur- 
rogate decision-maker for Congress. The Court would not even 
be in the business of deciding these cases absent the punt by 
Congress through its silence. While Congress has not spoken to 
the direct action a t  issue, Congress has articulated its position 
in Indian policy since the dawn of the modern era-the era in 
which this common-law analysis developed-as one that seeks 
to protect and develop Indian self-determination, self-govern- 
ment, autonomy, and economic development and self- 
sufficiency.45 If one bears that congressional policy in mind, it 
seems that the appropriate presumption to bring to most cases, 
if perhaps not all, is the one that presumes state action is in- 
valid unless Congress affirmatively extends state law to the 
transaction. Indeed, the Court may be constitutionally bound to 
bring this presumption to cases. No congressional grant of 
"immunity" from state law need be shown to escape state regu- 
lation. Because Congress is silent, the application of state law 
to the transaction is invalid. 
This, in fact, accurately describes the presumption that 
was brought to bear in preemption analysis before 1989 in 
many, though admittedly not all, of the cases decided under the 
common law.46 The opposite presumption was brought to bear 
44. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
45. See supra note 12 (briefly describing current policy). 
46. That is, Indian law preemption analysis often resulted in bringing to bear 
precisely the opposite presumption that is often brought to non-Indian preemption 
analysis. GETCHES, supra note 12, at 456. For this reason, non-Indian law preemp- 
tion cases are not cited in Indian law preemption cases, and vice versa. 
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally 
unhelphl to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those 
standards of preemption that have emerged in other areas of the law. 
Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences in the form and 
nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions 
of pre-emption that are properly applied to the other. 
White Mountain Apache IFibe, 448 US. at 143. 
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in situations that arguably did not implicate the notion of 
"sovereignty" that informs the choice of presumptions in favor 
of presuming the inapplicability of state law. I summarize 
below the four categories to which each presumption was 
brought and some illustrative cases.47 
1. Category 1 : Application of state law to Indians in Indian 
country 
This is the strongest category in which the presumption 
against the validity of state law applies. The failure of Con- 
gress to extend state authority to a given transaction means 
that the state law is invalid. No grant of congressional "immu- 
nity" from state regulation need be shown. Indeed, the state is 
without jurisdiction "absent an express authorization from 
47. In so doing, I must make the same disclaimer made by Professor 
Wilkinson in his book: 
I seek to explore the central ideas-the undercurrents of doctr inethat  
explain and justify the elaborate structure the Supreme Court has built 
in this field during the last quarter of a century. In doing this, I have 
been drawn primarily to the holdings and results of the cases, not just to 
the Court's stated reasons. This means that I sometimes identify concepts 
and employ terms not found in the opinions. Nonetheless, I am convinced 
that my approach accurately describes what in fact has occurred and that 
it plants a principled and comprehensive set of justifications for the field 
of Indian law. 
WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 3. 
My juxtaposing of the antipodal presumptions, for example, implies a per se 
approach explicitly rejected in the Court's language. In Ramah Navajo School 
Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), the Solicitor General specifically 
requested that the Court "hold that on-reservation activities involving a resident 
tribe are presumptively beyond the reach of state law even in the absence of com- 
prehensive federal regulation, thus placing the burden on the State to demonstrate 
that its intrusion is . . . condoned by Congress." Id. at 845. Justice Marshall's 
opinion, while striking down the state's attempt to tax an activity performed by 
non-Indians in Indian country, declined to adopt the test. Id. at  846. Instead, the 
Court purports to make a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, fed- 
eral, and tribal interests a t  stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in 
the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980). In short, the 
Court purports to engage in a balancing test under its preemption analysis. Cf. 
Stephen M. Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications 
for Federal Indian Law, 64 OR. L. REV. 667, 678 (1986) ("[Ilf contemporary Indian 
preemption analysis is ultimately a balancing test, is it really preemption?"). 
The Court's decisions invariably contain lengthy analyses of tangentially related 
statutes, treaties, and federal regulations that purportedly evidence whether state 
authority is preempted. Nevertheless, I believe that such analyses were the neces- 
sary supporting props that led to the outcomes that were nearly inevitable due to 
the prior choice of presumptions through which those statutes and treaties were 
viewed. 
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Congre~s.'"~ The direction of the presumption could not be 
more clear. Though the presumed exemption from state law 
does depend on the situs of the transaction being within Indian 
country, it applies even if the transaction is of a transitory 
character, i.e., one not relating to the land and which could 
have occurred just as easily off as on the reservation, such as 
the purchase of cigarettes. 
Thus, the wages earned by McClanahan, a Navajo, on the 
Navajo reservation were held not to be subject to state income 
ta~ation.~' The Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interests under oil 
and gas leases pertaining to reservation resources and issued 
to non-Indian lessees were held not subject to taxation by Mon- 
tana.50 The operation of gambling facilities by Indians on res- 
ervation land was held not subject to state reg~lat ion.~~ State 
excise taxes were held inapplicable to the sale of reservation 
land owned in fee by Indians.52 State excise taxes and regis- 
tration fees were held inapplicable to motor vehicles owned by 
Indians living on reservation land and used both on and off 
 reservation^.^^ Moreover, the purchase of cigarettes by Indi- 
ans on Indian reservations was held not subject to state sales 
and other cigarette taxes.54 
48. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993). 
49. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax COIIXII'~, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). The 
exemption from state income tax was extended to non-reservation land that never- 
theless constitutes "Indian country" in Oklahoma Tax Comrn'n v. Sac & Fox Na- 
tion, 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993). 
50. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985). 
51. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
52. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima In- 
dian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). Under a statutory analysis, the Yakima Court 
upheld the imposition of a state ad valorem property tax on fee-patented reserva- 
tion land owned,by Indians. The statute a t  issue, however, did not address excise 
taxes on the sale of land. Under the common-law approach taken in the case of a 
statutory void, that tax was struck down. 
The more intrusive tax-the tax on the Indian land itself-was upheld 
[which could result in foreclosure on the Indian-owned land with title 
vesting in the state], while the less intrusive tax-the tax on the act of 
selling the land-was struck down as invalid, as an impermissible intru- 
sion on Indian self-government and self-determination. It makes no sense. 
Geier, supra note 12, at 450 n.32 (criticizing the statutory analysis under which 
the property tax was upheld). 
53. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 
(1976). The exemption from excise and related motor vehicle fees was extended to 
non-reservation land that nevertheless constitutes "Indian country" in Oklahoma 
Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1991 (1993). 
54. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
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2. Category 2: Application of state law to Indians outside 
Indian country 
This is a category where the opposite presumption is 
brought to bear. Nondiscriminatory state laws otherwise appli- 
cable to all citizens of the state are presumed to apply to Indi- 
ans outside Indian country unless there is "express federal law 
to the ~ontrary.'"~ Again, the direction of the presumption 
could not be more clear. While state law can be held to be inap- 
plicable to Indians outside Indian country, a specific congres- 
sional grant of immunity from state action must be shown for 
Indians outside Indian country to escape state regulation. State 
law applies presumptively unless there is an express federal 
law to the contrary, such as a treaty expressly protecting off- 
reservation hunting or fishing.56 Because Congress is usually 
silent in these cases, state authority is upheld. Thus, New 
Mexico's gross receipts taxes could be assessed against the 
gross receipts realized by the Mescalero Apache Tribe with 
respect to the operation of its ski resort built outside its reser- 
~ a t i o n . ~ ~  
3. Category 3: Application of state law to non-Indians in Indi- 
a n  country: land-related transactions 
Until 1989, the same presumption described in category 
one applied here, even though the subject of the state action 
was non-Indian. State regulation was presumed invalid in In- 
dian country without an affirmative grant by Congress of "im- 
munity." Thus, Arizona could not impose its motor carrier li- 
cense tax and fuel tax on non-Indian logging companies, em- 
ployed by the White Mountain Apache Tribe to harvest the 
reservation's timber, to the extent the assessments were attrib- 
utable to travel on tribal roads.58 A non-Indian who was a fed- 
U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 US. 463 
(1976). 
55. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). 
56. Cf. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (upholding 
"terminated" tribe's continuing power to regulate hunting and fishing on land once 
reserved to them under a treaty). 
57. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
58. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 148-53 (1980). 
The tie to the land can be seen in Justice Marshall's admonition that "[tlhe Court 
has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical component to 
tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption 
inquiry." Id. at 151. 
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erally licensed "Indian trader" operating a permanent estab- 
lishment on reservation land was not subject to a "transaction 
privilege tax" assessed against the seller of goods, not the buy- 
er, for the privilege of doing business in Ari~ona.~' New Mexi- 
co was prevented from assessing its gross receipts tax on a non- 
Indian construction company that built a Navajo school on 
reservation land.60 That state was also prevented from super- 
imposing its hunting and fishing regulations on top of the 
Mescalero Apache Tribe's regulatory scheme as they pertained 
to nonmembers engaging in these activities on reservation 
trust land? 
4. Category 4: Application of state law to non-Indians in Indi- 
an country: transitory transactions 
The collective results in categories one, two, and 
three-that state law is presumed valid when applied to trans- 
actions outside Indian country (even though applied t o  Indians) 
and that state law is presumed invalid in Indian country (even 
though applied t o  non-Indians)-make conceptual sense when 
one remembers that sovereign power, which informs the choice 
of presumptions, must have a geographic c ~ m p o n e n t . ~ ~  Thus, 
the results in categories one, two, and three are reflected in the 
general assertion found in the often-cited 1982 edition of Felix 
S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law: "State law gener- 
ally is not applicable to Indian affairs within the territory of an  
Indian tribe, absent the consent of C~ngress . "~~  Professors 
59. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 
(1965). The same tax was held inapplicable to a company that sold 11 tractors to 
Gila River Farms, an enterprise of the Gila River Indian Tribe. See Central Mach. 
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980). Unlike in Warren Trading, 
the sales in Central Machinery were transitory; the seller had no permanent es- 
tablishment on the reservation. The potential taxpayer (the seller) was thus much 
like the potential taxpayers (the buyers) in the cigarette tax cases. See infra notes 
65-77 and accompanying text. For that reason, Justice Powell dissented in Central 
Machinery but concurred with the majority in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, decided the same day. See Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at  170 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
60. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 US. 832 (1982). 
61. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). 
62. "Theories of sovereignty have long rested on the primacy of territo- 
ry . . . ." Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Fed- 
eral Courts, 56 U.  C H I .  L. REV. 671, 700 (1989). See supra note 58 and infra note 
70 and accompanying text (quoting judicial pronouncements regarding the land 
component of sovereignty). 
63. COHEN, supra note 3, at  259. 
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Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams use even stronger language: 
"[Tlhere is effectively a heavy presumption against the incur- 
sion of state law into Indian country."64 
In the narrow situation when non-Indians travel to  Indian 
country and engage in transitory transactions unrelated to the 
land, however, the Court has applied the opposite presumption, 
described in category two, that state law applies absent affir- 
mative immunity granted by Congress, notwithstanding that 
the transaction took place in Indian country. Therefore, in this 
situation, state law applies to  non-Indians in Indian country 
with respect to  a transitory transaction, though not t o  Indians. 
Reservation sales of cigarettes to  non-Indians who trav- 
elled t o  the reservation in the hope of escaping state sales and 
other excise taxes imposed on the purchase of cigarettes came 
before the Court in 1976 and 1 9 8 0 . ~ ~  The involved tribes gen- 
erated substantial revenues through these smokeshops, reve- 
nues which were deployed in combating the severe poverty on 
the reservation. The Court conceded that the savings of approx- 
imately one dollar per carton that were realized by the non- 
Indians travelling to the reservation were the sole incentive for 
the non-Indians to make the trip. Absent the tax exemption, 
the business of the smokeshops, and thus the revenues realized 
by the tribes, would diminish ~ubstantially.~~ 
Though the Indians who purchased the cigarettes were 
held t o  be free from state taxes under the presumption de- 
scribed in category one, the Court declined to apply that pre- 
sumption to the non-Indian  purchaser^,^? notwithstanding 
that the purchases occurred in Indian country? Justice 
64. GETCHES, supra note 12, at 455. 
65. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 US. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 
(1976). 
66. See Coluille, 447 U.S. at 145. 
67. The Colville case actually went much further than applying state law to 
non-Indians in Indian country. The Court held that Indians who were nonmembers 
of the governing tribes were also subject to the state taxes at issue. See id., 447 
US. at  160-61; see also supra note 20 (describing similar equation of nonmember 
Indians with non-Indians in Duro u. Reina, a case arising in the criminal area 
which was subsequently overturned by congressional statute). 
68. The ability of the state to enforce its tax is another matter. Tribes have 
balked at  having to act as the state's collection mechanism. Though the Court has 
ruled that tribes must shoulder the "minimum burden" of collecting the otherwise 
valid tax imposed with respect to sales to nonmembers, see Moe, 425 U.S. at 483, 
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity prevents the states from suing the tribes 
for nonpayment. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 
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White's opinion in Colville concluded: 'We do not believe that 
principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of 
preemption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize In- 
dian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to 
persons who would normally do their business elsewhere."69 
There was no citation to the land cases in which non-Indians in 
Indian country were held to be free from state regulation and 
taxation, but Justice White noted that "the present taxes are 
assessed against nonmembers of the Tribes and concern trans- 
actions in personalty with no substantial connection to reserva- 
tion lands."70 
The Court clearly invoked the presumption that state law 
is valid rather than the presumption that state law is invalid. 
Justice White stated: 
498 U.S. 505, 508-10 (1991). States may, however, seize as contraband those ciga- 
rettes that fail to bear the stamp evidencing that the tax imposed on the retailer 
has been paid with respect to cigarettes intended for sale to nonmembers, so long 
as the seizures occur outside Indian country, i.e., while the cigarettes are still en 
route to the reservations from wholesalers. Colville, 447 U.S. at 161-62. The same 
issue has caused violence in the state of New York. See Lindsey Gruson, New 
Betrayal, Senecas Say, And New Rage, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1992, at  25; Depart- 
ment of Tax'n and Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114 S. Ct. 2028 (1994) (uphold- 
ing taxation of cigarettes sold by "Indian trader" wholesalers to reservation 
smokeshops to extent cigarettes were estimated, through "probable demand" esti- 
mates, to be sold to nonmembers). 
69. Colville, 447 U.S. a t  155. John Fredericks I11 argues that the notion that 
the Indians were marketing a tax exemption drove the decision's result, though he 
questions how that observation provides justification. 
Contrary to the Colville Court's reasoning, states commonly utilize their 
governmental status competitively to attract outside enterprise. Under the 
state sales tax schemes utilized in the United States, people can easily 
avoid one state's high sales tax by purchasing their goods across state 
lines in a neighboring state with a lower tax rate or no tax rate at  
all. . . . Admittedly, tribal sovereignty is limited; but it is Congress' [sic] 
role to limit it, not the Court's. Congress has not taken away the right of 
tribes to utilize their sovereign status to attract commercial enterprise to 
the reservation. 
John Fredericks 111, State Regulation in Indian Country: The Supreme Court's Mar- 
keting Exemptions Concept, A Judicial Sword Through the Heart of Tribal Self- 
Determination, 50 MONT. L. REV. 49, 63-64 (1989) (footnote omitted). The last sen- 
tence reveals his views regarding where the presumption should lie. 
Fredericks also takes issue with the Court's argument that the tribal taxing 
power is diminished since the value marketed by the tribe was not generated on 
the reservation. Fredericks points out that no showing was required by the state of 
Washington that the tobacco was grown in the state or that the cigarettes were 
manufactured or packaged in the state in order to assert its taxing power with 
respect to the sales occurring within the state. See id. at 63-67. 
70. Colville, 447 U.S. at  156. 
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The federal statutes cited to us, even when given the broadest 
reading to which they are fairly susceptible, cannot be said to 
pre-empt Washington's sales and cigarette taxes. [Statutes 
such a s  the Indian Reorganization Act and the Indian Self- 
Determination and Education Act] evidence to varying de- 
grees a congressional concern with fostering tribal self-gov- 
ernment and economic development, but none goes so far as  
to grant tribal enterprises selling goods t o  nonmembers an 
artificial competitive advantage over all other businesses in a 
State.71 
Similarly, in analyzing the susceptibility of Indians who were 
not members of the governing tribes to the state taxes a t  is- 
sue,72 Justice White stated: 
Federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which 
they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt 
Washington's power to impose its taxes on Indians not mem- 
bers of the Tribe. . . . [Tlhe mere fact that nonmembers resi- 
dent on the reservation come within the definition of "Indian" 
for purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 . . . 
does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt such 
Indians from state taxation.73 
In each case, Justice White assumed validity of the challenged 
state authority and required proof that Congress intended to 
provide an "exemption" from state law or to prohibit state law 
from having effect, even though the transactions occurred in 
Indian country. 
As noted, the Court applied the opposite presumption with 
respect to sales to member Indians. The same ambiguous, gen- 
erally unhelpful statutes were out there in both instances;74 
the difference in outcome stemmed from the difference in pre- 
sumptions taken into each analysis. The Court examined those 
same statutes with different purposes in mind. With respect to 
the nonmember purchasers, the Court examined the statutes to 
determine whether one could reasonably infer a congressional 
intent to  grant an immunity from state law. Finding no such 
intent, the Court approved taxes on nonmember purchasers. 
71. Id. at 155 (emphasis added). 
72. See supra note 67. 
73. Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
74. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 155-56 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 US. 
463, 477-79 (1976). 
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With respect to the member Indians, the Court examined those 
same statutes to determine whether one could reasonably infer 
a congressional intent to extend state law to the transaction. 
Finding no such intent, the Court concluded member Indians 
could not be taxed on their purchases. The Justices' purpose in 
one context was to find evidence of congressional immunity, 
while in another context it was to find evidence of congressio- 
nal extension of state law. 
Perhaps the choice to use the presumption assuming valid- 
ity of state authority can be justified in the category four case 
if one both attaches a heavy significance to the geographic 
component of sovereignty, which is perhaps weakened here in 
view of the transiency of the transaction, and stresses the non- 
member status of the person attempted to be reached by the 
state.75 That. is, both components of sovereignty are diluted 
here. There is certainly room for criticism, however.76 In any 
75. "[J]urisdidion is grounded in a rough mixture of territorial and personal 
criteria. Put another way, it matters both where things happen and to whom they 
happen." Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 
959, 978 (1991). 
76. The tribes are most certainly affected even though the non-Indian buyer 
is the one ostensibly taxed. The tribes often assert their own tax in addition to the 
state tax. If only the tribe's taxes apply, non-Indians are encouraged to travel to 
the reservation to buy their cigarettes so long as the tribal tax rate is lower than 
the state's rate that applies to off-reservation sales. If both taxes apply, the com- 
bined state and tribal tax dissuades buyers from coming to the reservation and 
even encourages reservation residents to travel outside the reservation to purchase 
cigarettes; tribal sales, and thus profits, are reduced or eliminated unless the tribe 
surrenders its own taxing power. The result hampers the current Indian policy of 
encouraging tribal economic development and self-sufficiency. (The same concerns 
apply to the severance taxes at  issue in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 
490 U.S. 163 (1989), see infra notes 86-109 and accompanying text, which is a 
much more troublesome case because the nowIndian mining activity sought to be 
taxed by the state was not transitory but intimately connected to reservation land.) 
The Court has not considered the impact on tribes to be sufficient to warrant 
applying the more favorable presumption in its preemption analysis. Justice 
B r e ~ a n  has noted the Hobson's choice this creates. 
Perhaps most striking is the fact that a rule permitting imposition of the 
state taxes would have the curious effect of making the federal concerns 
with tribal self-government and commercial development inconsistent with 
one another. In essence, Tribes are put to an unsatisfactory choice. They 
are free to tax sales to non-Indians, but doing so will place a burden 
upon such sales which may well make it profitable for non-Indian buyers 
who are located on the reservation to journey to surrounding communities 
to purchase cigarettes. Or they can decide to remain competitive by not 
taxing such sales, and in the process forgo revenues urgently needed to 
fill governmental coffers. Commercial growth, in short, can be had only a t  
the expense of tax dollars. And having to make that choice seriously 
intrudes on the Indians' right "to make their own laws and be ruled by 
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event, the transitory transaction involving nonmembers was 
the sole civil regulatory situation occurring in Indian country 
before 1989 in which the presumption favoring validity of the 
operation of state law was implicitly applied.77 If the transac- 
tion involved either Indians in Inchan country (category one) or 
nonmembers in Indian country in connection with a land-relat- 
them." 
Coluille, 447 U.S. a t  170-71 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (quoting Williams u. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219-20). See ako supra note 69 (de- 
scribing one commentator's attack on the decision). 
77. A niggling footnote is Rice v. Rehnar, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), a case not 
easily classified. I t  is a difficult case to place because the Court's analysis was so 
different from any preemption analysis either before it or after it. The Court decid- 
ed, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, that state liquor licensing requirements 
could apply to an Indian-owned establishment on a reservation that sold to both 
members and nonmembers. 
How the Court arrived at that result was puzzling. In determining whether the 
state action was preempted, the Court first considered whether the subject matter 
sought to be regulated was one traditionally regulated by the t r i b e a n  inquiry 
never before made in preemption analysis. Because the federal government histori- 
cally occupied the field extensively, disallowing the tribes any room to regulate 
independently, the Court concluded that the tribe had no tradition of regulating 
the subject matter. Thus, the backdrop of sovereignty, see supra note 42, was not 
significant in the preemption analysis. See Rice, 463 U.S. at 720-25. This turned 
the traditional preemption inquiry on its head. The Court has always cited the 
extensiveness of federal involvement in an area as a reason to conclude that the 
state was preempted from regulating the area. Here, the extensive history of feder- 
al liquor regulation in Indian country had precisely the opposite effect. 
If this analysis were undertaken in other cases, however, the result would not 
always be unfavorable for the tribes. After the cigarette tax cases, see supra notes 
65-76 and accompanying text, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 
(1982) (upholding tribal severance tax imposed on non-Indians mining reservation 
land), and Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (upholding tribal 
power to tax non-Indian leasehold interests and business activity in Indian country 
without approval of Secretary of the Interior), the tribal power to tax non-Indians 
was established. Yet, in neither the cigarette tax cases nor in Cotton Petroleum, see 
infra notes 86-109 and accompanying text, did the existence of the tribal power 
count against the existence of the state power to tax the same activities. 
During the course of the discussion, Justice O'Connor also stated in Rice in an 
offhand manner that in fact liquor regulation is an aspect of sovereignty of which 
tribes were divested by virtue of their dependent status, a truly startling proposi- 
tion. See 463 U.S. at 726 ("[Tlhe tribes have long ago been divested of any inher- 
ent self-government over liquor regulation by both explicit command of Congress 
and as a 'necessary implication of their dependent status.'") (emphasis added); infia 
notes 113-22 and accompanying text (describing the "exceptions" based on the 
tribes' dependent status t o  the general rule that tribes retain all aspects of sov- 
ereignty not specifically divested by Congress). I am not alone in thinking this 
opinion was truly bizarre. See Honorable William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of 
Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1987) (referring to 
the "prime peculiarity" of O'Connor's majority opinion). 
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ed transaction (category three), the opposite presumption was 
brought to bear and thus state authority was struck down. 
5. Cotton Petroleum: A switch in  presumptions 
The change in 1989, described below, was not a result of 
an explicit change in doctrine. Rather, it was a result of a shift 
in power on the Court and an accompanying switch in the 
presumptions brought to bear in preemption analysis. The pre- 
1989 decisions striking down state power in Indian country by 
adopting, under preemption analysis, the presumption that 
state law was invalid were most often written by Justices Mar- 
shall, Brennan, or Blackmun, though sometimes by others. In  
those cases, however, a steady stream of dissenting and sepa- 
rate opinions, usually written by Justices Stevens or 
Rehnquist, disagreed with the presumption taken that assumed 
invalidity of state law absent affirmative congressional exten- 
sion of the state law to Indian country. The writers of these 
dissents made it clear that they believed that the presumption 
adopted by Justice White in the category four case should apply 
in all category three cases and perhaps even category one cases 
as well. In 1989, these Justices finally controlled the Court and 
embedded their far different presumption into the preemption 
analysis. 
For example, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indi- 
ans?' was a pre-1989 category one case. I t  considered whether 
the state of California could regulate Indian-owned and oper- 
ated gambling casinos in Indian country. The majority opinion 
concluded that California had no such power absent congressio- 
nal extension of state authority to Indian country, explicitly 
invoking the presumption that  state law is inapplicable to 
Indians in Indian country absent affirmative authorization by 
Congress. "It is clear, however, that state laws may be applied 
to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly 
so provided. Here the State insists that Congress has twice 
given its express consent. . . . We disagree in both  respect^."^^ 
Justice Stevens dissented, however, expressly invoking the 
opposite presumption. 
Unless and until Congress exempts Indian-managed gambling 
from state law and subjects i t  to federal supervision, I believe 
78. 480 US. 202 (1987). 
79. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
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that a State may enforce its laws prohibiting high-stakes 
gambling on Indian reservations within its borders. Congress 
has not pre-empted California's prohibition against high- 
stakes bingo games and the Secretary of the Interior plainly 
has no authority to do so." 
The difference in threshold presumptions taken into the pre- 
emption analysis could not be more clearly articulated. Both 
writers analyzed the same statutes, but one looked for an im- 
plicit extension of state authority to Indians in Indian country. 
The other looked for a grant of immunity to  Indians in Indian 
country. Neither found what they were looking for. Thus, 
threshold presumptions determined outcomes. 
Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue8' and 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. B r a ~ k e r ~ ~  were category three 
cases, each dealing with land-related transactions in In&an 
country and involving non-Indians. The majority in each case 
held state taxation of the transactions at  issue t o  be unlawful, 
applying the familiar presumption that assumes the invalidity 
of state law in Indian country absent express extension by 
Congress, even though the activity is conducted by non-Indians. 
The dissent in White Mountain Apache Tribe, written by Jus- 
tice Stevens and joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, 
again adopted the presumption that state law governs unless 
Congress affirmatively prohibits its application. 
As a general rule, a tax is not invalid simply because a nonex- 
empt taxpayer may be expected to pass all or part of the cost 
through to a person who is exempt from tax. . . . In this case, 
. . . I would not infer the congressional intent to confer a tax 
immunity. Although this may be an appropriate way in which 
to.  subsidize Indian industry and encourage Indian self-gov- 
ernment, I would require more explicit evidence of congressio- 
nal intent than that relied on by the Court today." 
Justice Stevens presumed the non-Indians to be subject to 
the tax and did not infer from the statutes discussed in the 
case the congressional intent t o  confer an immunity from state 
regulation. Justice Rehnquist penned a similar dissenting opin- 
ion in Ramah, joined by Justices Stevens and White, which is 
80. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
81. 458 U.S. 832 (1982). 
82. 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
83. Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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infused with the presumption that state law presumptively 
applies to non-Indians in Indian country in category three cas- 
es. The dissent failed to find in the statutes discussed in the 
case affirmative evidence that Congress intended to prohibit 
application of, grant an immunity from, state law to the trans- 
action in Indian country.84 
In 1989, Justices Stevens and White, and those who joined 
their opinions, succeeded in establishing their minority posi- 
tions in majority and important plurality opinions in the cate- 
gory three context: the application of state law to nonmembers 
in Indian country with respect to land-related  transaction^.'^ 
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court in Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. u. New Mexicos6 upheld the authority of the 
state to impose its severance tax on the production of oil and 
gas by non-Indian lessees of wells located on the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe reservation. The Court had previously upheld the 
power of the tribe to  impose its own severance tax on the same 
activity." Confirmation of the validity of the state tax meant 
84. See 458 U.S. at  848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to "reservation 
immunity from nondiscriminatory state taxationn). 
85. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Brendale v. 
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). See 
infra notes 12 5-37 and accompanying text (discussing Brendale). 
86. 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
87. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Justice 
Stevens predictably wrote a dissenting opinion in Merrion, joined by Justice 
Rehnquist and then-Chief Justice Burger. Id. at  159 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cot- 
ton Petroleum was filed in response to an invitation extended by Justice Marshall 
in footnote 26 of the majority opinion in Merrion. One of the arguments made by 
the non-Indiap lessees in Merrion that the tribe had no power to impose a sever- 
ance tax on its mining activities was based on the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
Petitioners contend that because New Mexico may tax the same mining 
activity at full value, the Indian tax imposes a multiple tax burden on 
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The multiple 
taxation issue arises where two or more taxing jurisdictions point to some 
contact with an enterprise to support a tax on the entire value of its 
multistate activities, which is more than the contact would justify. This 
Court has required an apportionment of the tax based on the portion of 
the activity properly viewed as occurring within each relevant State. 
This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no claim 
that the Tribe seeks to tax any more of petitioners' mining activity than 
the portion occurring within Tribal jurisdiction. Indeed, petitioners do not 
even argue that the Tribe is seeking to seize more tax revenues than 
would be fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe. In the ab- 
sence of such an assertion, and when the activity taxed by the Tribe 
occurs entirely on tribal lands, the multiple taxation issue would arise 
only if a State attempted to levy a tax on the same activity, which is 
more than the State's contact with the activity would justify. In such a 
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practically tha t  the tribe would have to forgo its own tax in or- 
der to continue to attract lessees to mine reservation reserves 
rather than off-reservation reserves.88 
In  the course of the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens articu- 
lated the precise choice between presumptions tha t  is necessary 
under preemption analysis. 
This Court's approach to the question whether a State may 
tax on-reservation oil production by non-Indian lessees has 
varied over the course of the past century. At one time, such a 
tax was held invalid unless expressly authorized by Congress; 
more recently, such taxes have been upheld unless expressly 
or impliedly prohibited by C o n g r e s ~ . ~ ~  
The latter assertion is a bit disingenuous because it was Cotton 
Petroleum itself that  established as the majority rule that the 
appropriate presumption to apply is that  state action against 
non-Indians in  Indian country, even with respect to transac- 
tions intimately pertaining to land, is valid unless Congress 
acts to prohibit the application of state law. 
Justice Stevens made clear tha t  this presumption, formerly 
applied in Indian country only in the cigarette tax cases, was 
precisely the one he was applying. There could be no "market- 
ing of a tax exemption" here in connection with sales that are 
movable; here, there was an  intimate connection with reser- 
vation land, the geographic component of sovereign power. The 
circumstance, any challenge asserting that tribal and State taxes create a 
multiple burden on interstate commerce should be directed at the state 
tax, which, in the absence of congressional ratification, might be invalidat- 
ed under the Commerce Clause. These cases, of course, do not involve a 
challenge to state taxation, and we intimate no opinion on the possibility 
of such a challenge. 
Merrion, 455 U.S. a t  158 11.26. 
was 
490 
88. The Commerce Clause argument broached by Justice Marshall in Merrion 
rejected by the Court in Cotton Petroleum. 
I t  is . . . well established that the Interstate Commerce'and Indian Com- 
merce Clauses have very different applications. In particular, while the 
Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free trade 
among the States even in the absence of implementing federal legislation, 
the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Con- 
gress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs . . . . 
[Tlhe fact that States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the 
same territory makes it inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrine 
developed in the context of commerce "among" States with mutually exclu- 
sive territorial jurisdiction to trade "with" Indian tribes. 
U.S. at 192 (citations omitted). 
89. Id. at 173. 
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resources were not conveniently relocated to the reservation for 
subsequent removal. Yet, he required congressional evidence of 
a grant of "immunity" or "exemption" from the tax, just as in 
the category four cases involving transitory transactions, the 
purchase of cigarettes by n~n-Indians.~' "The question for us 
to decide is whether Congress has acted to grant the Tribe such 
immunity, either expressly or by plain i~nplication."~~ He not- 
ed that "it bears emphasis that . . . congressional silence no 
longer entails a broad-based immunity from taxation for pri- 
vate parties doing business with Indian tribesng2 and admon- 
ished that "courts should be careful not to make legislative 
decisions in the absence of congressional action."93 Thus, the 
affirmative action demanded of Congress was persuasive evi- 
dence that it  intended to grant an immunity or exemption from 
a presumptively applicable tax on non-Indians dealing with 
tribes in Indian country, even with respect to activities inti- 
mately pertaining to reservation land. A more stark adoption of 
the presumption he first championed in dissenting opinions 
cannot be imagined.94 
The federal statute examined for such evidence was the 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, which regulated mineral 
leasing in Indian country and which, predictably, "neither ex- 
pressly permits state taxation nor expressly precludes it."95 
Because of the presumption adopted, the state law was held 
not to be preempted. 
90. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text. 
91. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. a t  175-76 (emphasis added). The reference to 
the tribe as taxpayer is puzzling. The question was whether the non-Indian lessees 
were free from the tax. Justice Stevens emphatically rejected the argument that 
the economic burden of the tax was indirectly borne by the tribe. 
92. Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
93. Id. at 177. 
94. One of the arguments made by Justice Stevens in adopting this presump- 
tion is that the discredited intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine would have 
otherwise been revived through the back door. See id. at  173-76. That defunct 
doctrine prevented taxation by the state of private parties dealing with the federal 
government or its instrumentalities, including Indian tribes, on the theory that the 
state was indirectly taxing the federal government. Such reasoning, however, begs 
the question. Even though the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine is discred- 
ited, the majority of cases premised on that doctrine had nothing to do with Indi- 
an tribes. Under the completely independent preemption analysis, applying only in 
the case of Indian tribes, it is unclear why the presumption adopted by Justice 
Stevens was required. If a tax is struck down under preemption analysis, it is 
struck down for far different reasons than those that drove the intergovernmental 
tax immunity doctrine. 
95. Id. at 177. 
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Justice Blackmun wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. He, too, believed that 
the relevant statute to examine was the 1938 Act. He, too, 
found that "[tlhe 1938 Act is silent on the question of state 
taxation."96 But while that silence provided evidence to Jus- 
tice Stevens that Congress had not granted an immunity or 
exemption from the state tax at issue, it provided evidence to 
Justice Blackmun that Congress had not acted to extend the 
application of state law to non-Indians in Indian country in 
connection with such a transaction. "[Tlhe silence of the 1938 
Act is eloquent and argues forcefully against the result reached 
by the majority.'47 The difference in outlook, once again, was 
a result of the difference in the underlying presumption 
brought to bear when examining the only congressional evi- 
dence available, evidence which, as usual, did not answer the 
precise question before the Court. 
The dichotomy in presumptions applied in Indian country 
to land-related transactions, depending on whether the poten- 
tial taxpayer is Indian or non-Indian, could not have been more 
stark. In 1985, the Court held in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of 
Indiansg8 that New Mexico could not tax the royalties received 
by the tribe under its leases precisely because the 1938 Act did 
not expressly authorize taxation. Clearly, the presumption 
usually applicable in a category one caseg9 was applied that 
state law is presumptively invalid with respect to Indians in 
Indian country absent express extension by Congress of state 
law to the transaction. In Cotton Petroleum, Justice Stevens 
wrote: "Our conclusion that the 1938 Act does not expressly 
authorize direct taxation of Indian tribes does not entail the 
further step that the Act impliedly prohibits taxation of non- 
members doing business on a reser~ation."'~~ He thus makes 
it clear that he believes the opposite presumption applies in the 
case of the non-Indian taxpayer in a category three case, re- 
quiring evidence that Congress prohibited application of the tax 
instead of evidence that it extended application of the tax to the 
96. Id. at 194 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
97. Id. 
98. 471 U.S. 759 (1985). 
99. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (describing category one cas- 
es). 
100. 490 U.S. at 183 n.14 (emphasis added). 
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transaction, as in Blackfeet Tribe. Justice Blackmun was not 
convinced. 
But the majority takes the position that the 1938 Act's silence 
means something completely different when it  comes to the 
kind of taxation at  issue here, and expends considerable ener- 
gy attempting to support that view. The majority argues that 
the same silence that reflected an intent to prohibit state 
taxation of Indian tribes' royalty interests was "fully consis- 
tent with an intent to permit state taxation of nonmember les- 
s e e ~ . " ~ ~ ~  
Once again, the different viewpoints depend upon what each 
Justice is looking for in the only evidence available, which in 
turn depends on the threshold presumption brought to the 
preemption inquiry. 
Cotton Petroleum purported to make no new law. Yet, the 
approach adopted certainly is not consistent with such cases as 
Warren Trading,lo2 Ramah Navajo School B~ard , ' ' ~  and 
White Mountain Apache Tribe.'04 The fundamental switch in 
presumptions was possible because the presumptions were 
themselves almost invisible. Because the opinions ostensibly 
adopted a balancing test in its approach to Indian preemp- 
tion,'" the joints were flexible enough to allow whichever of 
the two presumptions to control without seeming to change the 
law. The federal and tribal interests that were held to be suffi- 
cient to preempt state law in Warren Trading, Ramah Navajo 
School Board, and White Mountain Apache Tribe were simply 
found to be insufficient to overcome state interests under the 
new presumption. The federal presence in Cotton Petro- 
leum-the extensive regulations under the 1938 Mineral Leas- 
ing Act-was more formidablelo6 than the federal presence 
examined in the prior cases. The state presence in Cotton Pe- 
troleum-regulating the spacing and mechanical integrity of 
wells (apparently also regulated by the federal govern- 
ment)'07-was minuscule. Yet, balancing tests being what 
101. Id. at 196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
102. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
103. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra note 47 (describing balancing test). 
106. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. a t  205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recount- 
ing the comprehensive and pervasive federal regulation). 
107. See id. at 206 n.9. 
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they are, the state presence was considered a weighty enough 
interest for the state's interests to control.108 But that was all 
merely the rhetoric of the opinion. The real reason for the out- 
come resided in the switch in the underlying presumptions 
brought to bear.'Og 
A second decision in 1989, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes 
& Bands of the Yakima Indian N a t i ~ n , ' ~ ~  cemented the view 
that the pre-1989 presumption in category three cases had 
been ousted in favor of the presumption that favors the validity 
of state law regarding the regulation of non-Indians in Indian 
country, even when the regulation is intimately related to land. 
In Brendale, the Court upheld the authority of Yakima County 
t o  extend its zoning laws to those areas of Indian country con- 
taining a significant percentage of fee-patented land owned by 
non-Indians."' Because that case also considered the power 
of the tribe to zone in Indian country, however, I defer discus- 
sion of the case to the next subsection.112 
108. Id. at 186-87. 
109. The result in Cotton Petroleum probably could have been predicted by 
Judge Canby. Writing in 1987, Judge Canby worried that the switch from the 
strict sovereignty approach of Williams v. Lee to McClanahan7s preemption ap- 
proach, adopting a balancing of interests, allowed for just the kind of fundamental 
but covert change in analysis exemplified by Cotton Petroleum. 
The McClanahan result was highly protective of tribal self-govern- 
ment, and one suspects that Chief Justice Marshall, had he been alive 
when McClanahan was decided, would have happily accepted it. But 
McClanahan contained the seeds of enormous change. By reducing sover- 
eignty to a backdrop and relying on the preemptive effect of federal trea- 
ties and statutes, it reversed the fundamental presumption of inherent 
tribal power applicable to disputes between tribes and states. 
. . . [Iln Indian law, as in many other areas, where the courts end up 
depends upon where they start. Justice Thurgood Marshall himself always 
applies his preemption analysis with great sensitivity to the "backdrop" of 
tribal sovereignty, but it is probably fair to say that he does that in spite 
of, rather than because of, the preemption doctrine he a ~ o u n c e d  in 
McClanahan. 
Canby, supra note 77, at  7. 
110. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
111. For an article discussing Brendale in depth and blasting it as a "recent 
outrage in the tragic history of federal Indian law," see Joseph William Singer, 
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U .  L. REV. 1, 7 (1991). 
112. See infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Sphere of Tribal Power in Indian Country 
On the flip side of the coin of the power of a state to regu- 
late in Indian country is the power of tribes t o  regulate in Indi- 
an country. It is appropriate here to address briefly the analy- 
sis that attaches to assertions of tribal power in Indian coun- 
try, for tribal power was also significantly eroded in the 1989 
Brendale case. In fact, it was the expansion of state power in 
Indian country (through the adoption of the presumption fa- 
voring state authority in category three cases) combined with 
the erosion of tribal power in Indian country (through an ex- 
pansive interpretation of the Montana exception)ll3 that 
made 1989 such a watershed year in Indian law. Cotton Petro- 
leum and Brendale combined to shift power in Indian country 
from tribes t o  states through the common law. 
With respect to assertions of tribal power over activities 
occurring on reservations, the Supreme Court long respected 
the teaching of Chief Justice Marshall in his trilogy that tribes 
retained the inherent sovereign powers they exercised prior to 
contact with the white man except to the extent inconsistent 
with their dependent status after European settlement. Thus, 
the general rule was that tribal power was retained unless 
a f i r n a  tiuely divested by Congress under its plenary power. 
Because Congress was most often silent, a de facto presump- 
tion arose that tribes retained the long-dormant powers they 
increasingly sought to exercise in recent decades.ll4 Until 
1978, the only two powers held implicitly to be divested by 
reason of the tribes' dependent status (and thus which had to 
be affirmatively "revived" or "delegated" by Congress under the 
opposite approach to the general rule) were those identified by 
Chief Justice Marshall and premised on his notions of interna- 
tional law: the power to treat with foreign nations and the 
power to dispose of aboriginal land title (entitling tribes to the 
use and occupancy of land) without the consent of the federal 
government. 115 
113. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (discussing Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)). 
114. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1985); 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982); Washington v. Confed- 
erated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980) (each 
case upholding the tribe's power to tax transactions undertaken by nonmembers in 
Indian country). 
115. See cases cited supra notes 30-3 1 and accompanying text. 
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As in the analysis of state power in Indian country, the 
outcome of the analysis of tribal power thus turns on the pre- 
sumption taken into the analysis. The Justices must decide 
whether to look for evidence that Congress divested a power 
otherwise retained by the tribe (i.e., whether the general rule 
applies) or whether to look for evidence that Congress delegat- 
ed a power implicitly divested by the tribes' dependent status 
(i.e., whether one of the exceptions to the general rule applies). 
Because Congress is silent, the choice between whether the 
general rule applies or whether one of the exceptions applies 
(i.e., the choice of presumptions) is (as in the analysis of the 
scope of state power) outcome determinative. The content of the 
exceptions and their scope thus become critical because they 
dictate which presumption is taken into the analysis. 
A century and a half passed before a third "exception" was 
added to the two identified by Chief Justice Marshall. In 
Olip hunt u. Suquamish Indian Tribe ,'I6 written by Justice 
Rehnquist in 1978, the power to impose criminal sanctions on 
non-Indians was held to be inconsistent with a tribe's depen- 
dent status. Thus, because this power was relegated to the 
"exceptiony' category, the presumption taken into the analysis 
was that the power must be "delegated" by Congress. Finding 
Congress silent, the power was held not to exist. 
The change in presumptions when analyzing the scope of 
tribal power in Indian country is much more explicit than in 
the case of analyzing the scope of state power in Indian coun- 
try. The Court must explicitly adopt an "exception" to the gen- 
eral presumption that sovereignty continues with respect to the 
subject matter. The change in analysis cannot be hidden under 
the rubric of a balancing test. The Court's announcement of an 
additional exception in Oliphant after 150 years, with the con- 
comitant explicit switch in underlying presumptions, has thus 
been the subject of much criticism."' 
116. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
117. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 17, at 1160-64 (analyzing the weaknesses in 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion); Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal 
Indian Law, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1209 (1989) (recounting Judge Canby's criti- 
cisms that (1) while the first two exceptions noted by Chief Justice Marshall were 
premised in European notions of international law, the additional exception fash- 
ioned in Oliphant was not premised on any source in particular, and (2) the prac- 
tice of creating exceptions based on nothing but judicial preference may threaten 
tribal autonomy); Kevin Meisner, Modern Problems of Criminal Jurisdiction in 
Indian Country, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 175 (1992) (entire piece criticizing 
Oliphant). 
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A fourth exception, this time on the civil side, was added in 
1980 in Montana u. United States."' In an opinion written by 
Justice Stewart, the Court held that the power to regulate non- 
Indians on fee-patented, reservation land in the absence of a 
sufficient "tribal interest" at stake was similarly inconsistent 
with the tribes' dependent status. Because Congress was silent, 
tribes were considered to have lost the power to regulate non- 
Indians on fee-patented land unless the tribe could show that 
the regulation had a "direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."llg If 
the tribal-interest test was met, the matter was once again put 
back into the general-rule category. That is, even in the face of 
congressional silence, the tribal power would be upheld. 
Finding that the tribal-interest test was not met, and finding 
no delegation of power by Congress, the Montana Court held 
that the tribe had no power to regulate hunting and fishing on 
fee-patented land held by non-Indians on the reservation.l2' 
On the other hand, even such staunch supporters of tribal power as Vine 
Deloria, Jr., recognize the "reality" surrounding Oliphant. 
The Port Madison Reservation where the tribe lived contained 7,276 
acres, 63% of which, or approximately 4,584 acres, was owned by non- 
Indians. While 2,928 non-Indians lived on the reservation, only fifty Indi- 
ans resided there. The factual situation, therefore, was somewhat bizarre. 
The attorneys for the Indians were arguing that fifty Indians, 1.7% of the 
reservation population, should have basic municipal jurisdiction over near- 
ly 3,000 non-Indians, more than 98.3% of the population of the reserva- 
tion. The doctrine of tribal sovereignty, perhaps relevant for a large reser- 
vation such as the Navajo with millions of acres of land and over 100,000 
residents, was expected to control the court's thinking in defiance of the 
actual facts. Surely, here was an instance of a doctrine run amok. 
When attorneys and scholars come to believe that doctrines have 
greater reality than the data from which they are derived, all aspects of 
the judicial process suffer accordingly. 
Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Con- 
tent and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARE. L. REV. 203, 215 (1989) (foot- 
notes omitted) (quoted in Frickey, supra note 17, at  1237 n.466). Frickey's thesis is 
premised on the practical nature of the reasoning process in Indian law. 
The Court's creation of a sweeping "exception" that applies to all tribes is per- 
haps the chief criticism of Oliphant. Alternatively, the Court could have maintained 
the presumption in favor of tribal power but, because of the unique facts of the 
case, held that the presumption was rebutted for this tribe. That would have left 
the Navajos, for example, free to develop their sovereign power to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country. 
118. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
119. Id. at 566. 
120. In 1993, the Court extended this holding to non-trust reservation land 
held by the federal government, where the state's interest is far more attenuated 
than where the land is held by non-Indian residents of the state asserting jurisdic- 
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Both the Montana exception itself as well as the applica- 
tion of the tribal-interest test to the facts of the case could be 
questioned. Because all roads lead back to Congress, the real 
question is which powers are so intimately related to depen- 
dent as opposed to independent sovereignty that the burden of 
proof should be shifted to show a delegation by Congress of the 
asserted power. Other matters excepted from the retained-pow- 
er-unless-divested general rule were very fundamental powers: 
transferring of aboriginal land title, treating with foreign pow- 
ers, and imposing criminal sanctions on non-Indians. Is the 
Montana exception of the same magnitude? And even if we 
accept the Montana exception as an appropriate occasion to 
shift the burden to show a delegation of power by Congress 
absent a sufficient "tribal interest," why was there no sufficient 
tribal interest in regulating hunting and fishing on these reser- 
vation lands? How can tribes regulate effectively, especially 
hunting, on those lands over which the Court agrees the tribe 
has jurisdiction if such lands are checkerboarded among non- 
Indian, fee-patented land on the reservation? And should not 
on-reservation hunting and fishingper se fall under the general 
rule as satisfying the tribal-interest test? Does not such regula- 
tion have a "direct effect"12' on the economic security of the 
tribe?lZ2 
Until Brendale, the Montana exception lay dormant in the 
lower courts.123 In the Supreme Court, it was not mentioned 
in  either of two cases that stressed that tribes retained "aktrib- 
utes of sovereignty over both their members and their territo- 
But Justice White's opinion in Brendale not only re- 
vived it but interpreted it in such a manner as to make it virtu- 
ally impossible to satisfy the tribal-interest test (and thus re- 
tion. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993). 
121. Montana, 450 U.S. at  566. 
122. If we take seriously Justice O'Connor's offhand remark in Rice v. Rehnar, 
see supra note 77, there is yet a fifth exception based on the tribes' dependent 
status: the ability to regulate liquor in Indian country. 
123. See Brian J. Campbell, Comment, Tribal Power to Zone Nonmember Land 
Within Reservations: The Uncertain Status of Retained Tribal Power over Nonmem- 
bers, 21 ARK ST. L.J. 769, 779 n.90 (1989) (listing cases). 
124. Iowa Mutual Insurance v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (emphasis 
added) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)); Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140 (1982) (emphasis added) (quoting United 
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)); see Campbell, supra note 123, at  778- 
79 (discussing decisions). 
4511 INDIAN LAW 487 
vert to the general rule under which the power is upheld in the 
face of congressional silence). 
The reservation in Brendale was comprised of eighty per- 
cent trust land and twenty percent fee-patented land, both 
Indian and non-Indian owned.lz5 Most of the fee-patented 
land was incorporated in three towns in what was referred to 
as the "open area" of the reservation, an area open to the gen- 
eral public. About fifty percent of the open area was comprised 
of fee-patented land. The remaining fee-patented land was 
scattered throughout the reservation in what was referred to as  
the "closed area" of the reservation, an area generally closed 
except to members of the tribe. The tribe's zoning ordinances 
applied to all reservation lands, whether trust land or fee-pat- 
ented land. The County of Yakima's zoning ordinances applied 
to all land within the county except Indian trust lands. Thus, 
there was an overlap of asserted jurisdiction with respect to 
fee-patented lands within the reservation. Naturally, the ordi- 
nances differed in substance so that disagreements arose re- 
garding which zoning ordinance applied to that land. 
Brendale, a nonmember, wanted to develop a fee-patented 
parcel of land in the closed area of the reservation, which con- 
tained very little fee-patented land. The development would 
have complied with the county's ordinance but would have 
violated the tribe's ordinance. Wilkinson, also a nonmember, 
wanted to develop a fee-patented parcel of land in the open 
area, in which the fee-patented land constituted about fifty 
percent of the land. Once again, the development would have 
complied with the county's ordinance but would have violated 
the tribe's ordinance. Congress was-not surprising- 
ly-absolutely silent with respect to the relative scope of au- 
thority of a state and tribe to regulate land use on a reserva- 
tion. Presumptions would therefore once again be determina- 
tive. 
The Court produced three opinions, none of which had 
majority support. Justice White was joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy. That opinion affirmed the 
exclusive power of the state to zone the Wilkinson 
property.lz6 Because Justice Stevens, joined by Justice 
O'Connor, agreed in a second opinion that the state had the 
125. The recitation of the fads following in the text is found at 492 U.S. at 
414-19. 
126. See id. at 432 (White, J.). 
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exclusive authority to zone the Wilkinson property,127 Justice 
White's opinion announced the result in the Wilkinson case. 
Neither opinion, however, directly analyzed the power of the 
state to regulate in Indian country. Rather, each analyzed the 
tribe's power to regulate this land and concluded that the tribe 
had no such power. The implication was clear, then, that both 
Justice White and Justice Stevens, as well as those who joined 
these opinions, presumed state law otherwise to apply to this 
category three case?' A conclusion that the tribe had power 
to regulate the land would simply have been the affirmative 
evidence that would have persuaded both Justice White and 
Justice Stevens that the presumptively applicable state law 
was preempted because both sets of laws, unlike in the tax 
cases, could not apply concurrently. 
The ability to regulate land use on the reservation surely 
has a "direct effect on the political integrity, the economic secu- 
rity, or the health or welfare of the tribe,"12' so long as one 
views land use in its broad, generic sense. Yet, Justice White 
refused to analyze the issue generically and thus refused to 
concede that the tribal-interest test was met. He believed that 
Montana required each particular proposed use of land to be 
analyzed for its individual effect on the tribe: "[Nlot only would 
regulatory authority depend in the first instance on a factual 
inquiry into how a tribe's interests are affected by a particular 
use of fee land, but as circumstances changed over time, so, too, 
would the authority to zone."130 Thus, Justice White conclud- 
ed that this case fell under the exception to the general rule 
that tribal power is retained unless explicitly divested by Con- 
gress and, therefore required evidence that Congress specifical- 
ly delegated the power to zone the reservation land a t  issue. 
Finding no such delegation, he determined that the tribe had 
no such power, which in turn meant that the state's power was 
not preempted. 13' 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Mar- 
shall, vehemently disagreed that the proper way to approach 
the tribal-interest test was through a transaction-by-transac- 
127. See id. at 444-47 (Stevens, J.). 
128. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (defining "category three" 
cases). 
129. Montana v.. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
130. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430 (White, J.). 
131. Id. at 425-28. 
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tion analysis, but his was a dissenting opinion in the Wilkinson 
case. 
It  would be difficult to conceive of a power more central to 
"the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribey7 
. . . than the power to zone. . . . And how can anyone doubt 
that a tribe's inability to zone substantial tracts of fee land 
within its own reservation-tracts that  are inextricably inter- 
mingled with reservation trust lands-would destroy the 
tribe's ability to engage in the systematic and coordinated 
utilization of land that is the very essence of zoning authori- 
ty? 
The threat to the tribe does not derive solely from the pro- 
posed uses of specific parcels of fee lands (which admittedly 
would vary over time and place). The threat stems from the 
loss of the general and longer-term advantages of compre- 
hensive land management.132 
The opinion by Justice Stevens rested on his view regard- 
ing the origins of tribal power rather than whether the Mon- 
tana exception applied. Tribal power is not simply "inherent" in 
his view. Rather, he views tribal power as resting on the histor- 
ical power of tribes to exclude nonmembers from their lands. 
The power to exclude, in his opinion, contains "the lesser power 
to reg~late." '~~ Once that power to exclude is dissipated 
through demographic changes-even demographic changes 
thrust upon tribes involuntarily-the tribal power is also dissi- 
pated? In Brendale, he thus concluded that a transfer of 
132. Id. at 458, 460 (Blackmun, J.) (citation omitted). 
133. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J.). 
134. See id. at 436-37 (Stevens, J.). His dissent in Merrion, see supra note 87 
and accompanying text, was premised, for example, on the fact that the tribe did 
not condition entry onto the reservation to mine on the payment of a tribal sever- 
ance tax. He thus concluded the tribe had no power, based on the power to ex- 
clude, to tax the nonmember miners that the tribe allowed to enter the reserva- 
tion. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 159-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, for 
the Merrion majority, strenuously disagreed. "The power does not derive solely 
from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it 
derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity 
within its jurisdiction . . . ." 455 U.S. at 137. 
Indeed, the dissent apparently views the tribal power to exclude, as well 
as the derivative authority to tax, as merely the power possessed by any 
individual landowner or any social group to attach conditions, including a 
"tax" or fee, to the entry by a stranger onto private land or into the 
social group, and not as a sovereign power. 
490 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
large tracts of land within a reservation to nonmembers under 
the allotment policy involuntarily imposed on tribes in an earli- 
er era would destroy the tribe's zoning power, whereas reserva- 
tion land checkerboarded with only a few tracts of land owned 
in fee by nonmembers would continue to  be subject to tribal 
authority, even if owned in fee by nonmembers. Because the 
closed area contained relatively few nonmember-owned, fee- 
patented parcels, tribal zoning of the closed area was proper in 
his view, even if owned by a nonmember. Thus, Brendale's par- 
cel, he reasoned, should be held to be outside the state's juris- 
diction. Because Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall 
and Brennan, agreed with this result, though for different 
reasons, the state was held not to have jurisdiction over 
Brendale's parcel. The Stevens opinion agreed with Justice 
White's result with respect to the Wilkinson property because 
that tract of land lies within the open area, which was owned 
about fifty percent in fee by non-1ndians.lS5 
Because Justice Blackmun views tribal sovereignty as 
inherent-a power that predated the arrival of the white man 
and the creation of reservations from which Indians could ex- 
clude nonmembers and thus not based on the right to exclude 
memorialized in any treaty-he would consider only whether 
the Montana exception would apply to force the tribe to show a 
delegation by Congress of the power to zone nonmember lands 
on the reservation. As noted,ls6 he believed the tribal-interest 
test was satisfied, thus placing the case under the general rule 
that the power is retained unless specifically divested. In the 
face of congressional silence, the power would be upheld. Thus, 
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall would have ruled 
that the tribe had exclusive authority to zone both properties 
while the state had no authority to zone in Indian country.137 
Id. at 146. 
135. How can tribes interpret the three Brendale opinions? Because Justices 
White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy would have opposed tribal zoning of any fee 
land, while Justices Blackmun, Breman, and Marshall would have permitted tribal 
zoning of all reservation land, the opinion by Stevens will determine the extent to 
which a tribe can zone reservation fee land. That opinion, in turn, depends on the 
percentage of nonmember-owned fee land in a given area. If the percentage of fee 
land owned by non-Indians is high enough (how high?), the tribe loses its power to 
zone. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 476 (3d ed. 1991). 
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
137. See Brendale, 492 US. at  448-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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IV. THE CRITIQUE 
After Cotton Petroleum and Brendale and the presumptions 
they memorialize, only one situation remains in which "there is 
effectively a heavy presumption against the incursion of state 
law into Indian country":138 the application of state law to 
member Indians in Indian country (the category one case).lsg 
This fundamental shift in power from tribes to the states in  
Indian country was accomplished through the common law in  
an  era in which the Court continues to claim that Congress 
possesses plenary power to decide such questions and in which 
the Indian policy of Congress is one of tribal autonomy, empow- 
erment, and economic development. Writing two years before 
Cotton Petroleum and Brendale, the optimistic Charles 
Wilkinson opined: "[Flor all of its many flaws, the policy of the 
United States toward its native people is one of the most pro- 
gressive of any nation. This is particularly true of judge-made 
law."140 The pendulum, however, has swung, a t  least in the 
Supreme Court.141 
Much more than the substantive outcomes, however, 
should be questioned here. After wending one's way through 
the rhetorical process used by the Court in creating the con- 
tours of tribal sovereignty, one is struck by the intrinsic weak- 
ness of that process itself and its resulting ill effects on the 
development of substance. The Court first announces that the 
138. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
139. This rule seems safe at present. In 1993, the Court confirmed the 
McClanahan rule that the wages and automobiles of Indians in Indian country are 
not subject to state taxation. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. 
Ct. 1985 (1993). 
140. WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 5 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
141. In a seminal piece, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., identified a 30- 
year cycle in American politics and domestic policy. 
[The cycles] are only fluctuations, rhythms, in the short-run politics of a 
single country. They may foreshadow but do not control the shape of 
things to come. Because the cycle is not a pendulum swinging between 
fmed points but a spiral, it admits novelties and therefore escapes deter- 
minism (and confounds prophecy). 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American Politics, in ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 30-31 (1986). The cyclical shifts 
in American Indian policy have been more pronounced than the shifts in the gen- 
eral political landscape, and they have been just about as regular. I t  has now been 
30 years sioce the dawn of the era of self-determination, see svpra note 12, and 
the pendulum appears to be swinging back again. Unlike previous pendulum 
swings, however, this one seems to be originating with the Supreme Court rather 
than with Congress. 
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contours of tribal and state sovereignty in Indian country are 
properly matters for Congress to decide. In analyzing the scope 
of state power in Indian country, the Court then uses language 
implying that Congress has indeed decided the matter-either 
i t  has or has not "preempted" state power or "delegated" tribal 
power-and thus the Court implies that it is doing nothing 
more than giving voice to the rule articulated by Congress in 
treaties and tangentially related statutes. Yet, cursory reading 
of these opinions shows that there is no evidence one way o r  
another regarding whether Congress preempted state power o r  
delegated tribal power with respect t o  the particular matter a t  
issue. The Court creates law while hiding behind the rubric of 
congressional preemption and delegation. Institutional respon- 
sibility for the substance of the outcome in Indian law is thus 
masked. As Professor Rotenberg noted, "The Court based pre- 
emption on congressional 'non-law.' In lieu of law, the Court 
relied on congressional policy. Once again, Congress received 
credit or blame for actions that it had never taken when, in 
fact, the Court was responsible for both the creation of the 
policy and its implementati~n."'~~ The Court "hides behind 
phantom decisions by others."143 The process is institutionally 
circular. 
Moreover, through the use of shifting presumptions, the 
common law is fundamentally altered without language indi- 
cating the fundamental shift in power from one sovereign to 
another. Without overturning precedent, the Court has, in 
Morgan's words, "changed the accepted rules of the common 
law without the appearance of judicial legislation'?'" through 
the facile use of presumptions. The means by which the law is 
changed is an implicit shift in presumptions rather than an 
explicit rejection of doctrine and the creation of new doctrine, 
which allows the Court to effect significant shifts in sovereign 
power in Indian country without having to explain and defend 
the ultimate substantive position adopted. 
Because the decisions are framed around the argument 
technique described at length in this Essay-the argument- 
from-ignorance in the face of indeterminacy and the use of 
presumptions to resolve the indeterminacy-the decisions are 
142. Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 375, 382 (1992). 
143. Id. at 383. 
144. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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filled with analysis of (nonexistent) congressional evidence of 
intent rather than with reasoning that supports the case's 
ultimate delineation of the spheres of state and tribal power, 
respectively. Stated differently, the Court's rhetorical process 
allows the Court t o  skirt the fundamental inquiry: What is 
tribal sovereignty? The language in Williams u. ~ e e ' ~ ~  held 
the potential to allow the Court to grapple forthrightly with the 
issue, taking responsibility for the definition of the term and 
openly discussing the competing tensions underlying it. But the 
Court replaced the sovereignty approach of Williams u. Lee 
with the language of preemption, altering the dynamics of the 
analysis in a manner inimical to a wise and rational decision- 
making process regarding the development of the definition of 
tribal sovereignty. 
What roles should the geographic boundaries of Indian 
country, land ownership within Indian country, and tribal 
membership play, respectively? How should the radically diver- 
gent circumstances of the various tribes affect the notion of 
tribal sovereignty? The Navajo-on a reservation larger than 
many states, with a population greater than many states, and 
with a language and culture that has survived colonialism-is, 
after all, worlds apart from the Mashantucket Pequot in  
Ledyard, Connecticut. 
How, if a t  all, should the power exercised by tribes in Indi- 
an  country differ from the power exercised by the federal gov- 
ernment or states in their respective geographical jurisdictions? 
The limitations on tribal sovereignty based on membership and 
property ownership (as opposed to reservation boundaries) are 
limitations that are not imposed on the sovereignty of the 
states or the federal g0~e rnmen t . l~~  Perhaps the rules are 
wise, perhaps they are not; yet, no defense or even discussion 
of the resultant rules needs to be undertaken solely because of 
the process adopted in arriving at these rules.How should the 
differing views regarding the origin of tribal sovereignty affect 
its scope today? Justice Stevens' conception of tribal sovereign- 
ty as originating in the power to exclude non-Indians from 
reserved lands is worlds apart from Justice Blackmuds and 
Justice Marshall's articulation of tribal sovereignty as an in- 
herent power that allows regulation of economic activity re- 
145. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
146. See Dussias, supra note 4, at 86-96. 
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gardless of whether the tribe could exclude those r eg~1a ted . l~~  
Yet, even these differing articulations are never front and ten- 
ter in these opinions, as they should be; they are merely back- 
drops, implied assumptions regarding tribal sovereignty that 
are never analyzed or defended but rather merely announced. 
Asking whether Congress has preempted the particular 
state action at issue or whether it has delegated to tribes the 
particular power at issue (if a majority of the Justices believe 
the tribal power a t  issue is inconsistent with tribes' dependent 
status) allows both Congress and the Court to avoid system- 
atically and comprehensively defining tribal sovereignty as an 
independent matter. Congress, which the Court insists has the 
plenary power to define tribal sovereignty, is reactive only, 
periodically passing a narrow statute addressing a single issue, 
often to overturn or modify a Supreme Court decision ostensi- 
bly made in the name of preemption by Congres~ . '~~  The dis- 
jointed process used by Congress and the Supreme Court 
means that no systematic and enduring vision of tribal sov- 
ereignty can result. The word "power" in the title of this Essay 
was thus intended to refer not only t o  the allocation of power 
between states and tribes to regulate civil affairs in Indian 
country but also t o  the balance of power between Congress and 
the Supreme Court-and the resulting vacuum of power in 
practice-in delineating that al10cation.l~~ 
147. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., supra note 20. 
149. Exacerbating the problem described here is the anecdotal evidence sug- 
gesting that the Court and some commentators don't perceive Indian law to be 
very important or intellectually satisfying. That perception fuels the desire to avoid 
dealing with the fundamental intellectual and political issues that are present in 
defining tribal sovereignty. The present decision-making process successfully allows 
both the Court and Congress to avoid entangling themselves in the larger question. 
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Where the Action Is: Congress, Not the Supreme 
Court, WALL ST. J., April 20, 1994, at A15 ('Where is the excitement and chal- 
lenge in being a rubber stamp? How many cases of Indian jurisdiction and bank- 
ruptcy does George Mitchell want to handle?"). Even Justice Blackmun, a champion 
of tribal sovereignty, has expressed similar themes. 
Even the Justices themselves have been known to chafe at  the grind- 
ing dullness of some of the opinions they are assigned to write. 
"If one's in the doghouse with the Chief, he gets the crud," Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun . . . said in a speech to a group of judges last sum- 
mer. "He gets the tax cases, and some of the Indian cases, which I like 
but I've had a lot of them." 
"You know," the 78-year-old jurist added, "there are cases that are fun 
to write. And there are cases that are not." 
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The allocation of power between states and various 
tribes-considered individually in their own dramatically diver- 
gent conte~ts'~~-is political and should be resolved by Con- 
gress with the intimate involvement of the affected states and 
tribes.lsl I am not optimistic about that happening, however, 
because of the nature of the Court's recent decisions in favor of 
state sovereignty and to the detriment of tribal sovereignty and 
the congressional inertia that arises both from those results 
and from the absence of a large Indian con~tituency.'~~ 
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
1986, at  B14. Cf. Michael C. Blumm & Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of 
Appeals: A Modest Proposal to Eliminate Supreme Court Jurisdiction over Indian 
Cases, 46 ARK. L. REV. 203, 206-07 (advocating eliminating Supreme Court jurisdic- 
tion over Indian law cases and vesting it in a new Indian Court of Appeals staffed 
with "panels selected from interested circuit and district court judges . . . who are 
interested in Indian cases and who think Indian law is an important subject of 
federal law"). 
150. See Nell Jessup Newton, Let a Thousand Policy-Flowers Bloom: Making 
Indian Policy in the Twenty-First Century, 46 ARK. L. REV. 25, 67 (1993) (disagree- 
ing with the premise that it is appropriate to construct a "grand theory" or "uni- 
fied field theory" of Indian law). "As messy and difEcult as it is, Congress must 
deal with individual tribes, for it is with the tribes, and not a mythical large tribe 
called 'Indian country' with which Congress has a political relationship." Id. at 75. 
See supra note 117 (discussing how the outcome in Oliphant, which denied the 
right of a tribe to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, perhaps was 
defensible for the particular tribe a t  issue but not defensible for such tribes as the 
Navajo). 
151. A more modest alternative if this proves too ambitious for Capitol Hill to 
achieve would be for Congress to pass a general statute directing the courts to 
interpret its silence in any given subject-matter area regarding the respective 
spheres of state and tribal power in Indian country as meaning that state power is 
preempted in favor of tribal power. If Congress disagrees with the outcome of any 
particular case under such an approach, it could reverse it by specific legislation. 
If the Court remains true to its approach of looking to congressional intent, 
such a statute should stop the misuse of congressional silence by courts as indica- 
tive of congressional intent to bless state power over Indian country activities and 
should produce substantive outcomes consistent with Congress's current Indian law 
policy of self-determination in most instances. I t  should also produce a process 
more consistent with Congress's current Indian law policy of self-determination 
because it would require Congress to invoke the cumbersome process of legislation 
only to narrow tribal sovereignty (by reversing a court decision that Congress feels 
inappropriately expands it) rather than to expand tribal sovereignty (by overturning 
decisions inconsistent with current policy, such as Brendale and Cotton Petroleum). 
The Court's BrendalelCotton Petroleum presumptions, in other words, would be 
reversed by statute. Such a statute might be difficult for some members of Con- 
gress to support, however, in lieu of its open-ended and nonspecific nature. 
152. "The current Indian population represents only 0.76% of the population of 
the nation-a figure that leaves Indian demands for redressing the legacy of con- 
quest a quiet whisper barely heard above the din of political debate about issues 
affecting numerically greater proportions of the society." Robert N. Clinton, Redress- 
ing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 
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An example illustrates the point. As Philip Frickey recog- 
nized,ls3 the Court was perhaps a t  its pragmatic best in 
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation.'" The Oneida 
claimed that their ancestors transferred 100,000 acres to the 
State of New York in 1795 in violation of federal law and thus 
requested that their aboriginal title be confirmed and back rent 
paid. Writing for five Justices, Justice Powell upheld the ability 
of the tribe to pursue their claim free of such affirmative de- 
fenses as statutes of limitations and laches! Powell wrote that 
the Court "recognized . . . the potential consequences of affir- 
m a n ~ e " ' ~ ~  but that the Solicitor General noted that "Congress 
has enacted legislation to extinguish Indian title and claims 
related thereto in other eastern States, . . . and it could be 
expected t o  do the same in New York should the occasion 
arise."15'j Powell concluded, 'We agree that this litigation 
makes abundantly clear the necessity for congressional 
action."157 The ball was punted to Congress, where it belongs, 
through the medium of the Court's decision. Congress worked 
with the states and the affected tribes in other eastern land 
claims to arrive a t  equitable settlements agreed to by all.15' 
Frickey observed: 
As Chief Justice Marshall did, the Court expected Congress to 
carry the burden of resolving the consequences of colonization, 
even in the contemporary context-indeed, one might say, 
especially in the contemporary context. John Marshall faced 
situations in which the Court accommodated colonization by 
necessity; no other entity was as  well situated to rationalize 
the underlying premises of colonization, such as  original Indi- 
an title, the exclusive tribal-federal relationship, and the 
sovereignty of tribes. Chief Justice Marshall's own 
situatedness essentially required him to incorporate some 
aspects of colonization into American public law. Today, how- 
ever, i t  is difficult to see why the Court should give any spe- 
cial solicitude to arguments for expanding the influence of 
46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 78 (1993). 
153. Frickey, supra note 17, at 1235-37. 
154. 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
155. Id. at 253. 
156. Id. (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae). 
157. Id. 
158. See, e.g., Maine Indians Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. 
1$1$ 1721-1735 (1988) (described in GETCHES, supra note 12, at 117). 
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colonization, especially when Congress has authority to take 
that  perspective into account. lsg 
Unfortunately, the Court's repeated affirmance of state 
power in Indian country will not likely pressure Congress into 
acting, unlike the Court's decision in Oneida. The constituency 
for independent congressional action rarely is strong 
enough.160 For that reason, the Court's decisions are doubly 
troubling: They effectively usurp the legislative function in the 
name of honoring legislative will. The change in common-law 
presumptions described in this Essay is thus more insidious 
than a similar change in presumptions regarding the allocation 
of powers under the Constitution between the federal branches 
of government, between the federal government and the states, 
or between government and an individual, issues with respect 
to which the Court is intended t o  be the ultimate arbiter. The 
Court's repeated assertions that Congress, not the Court, has 
plenary power in Indian law as well as the general admonition 
that the Court should not engage in "judicial legislation"161 
begin to ring hollow. 
159. Frickey, supra note 17, a t  1237. 
160. But see supra note 20 (describing two instances in which Congress was 
prompted to action in response to Supreme Court decisions). One such decision was 
favorable to Indians and Congress essentially confirmed the decision with a more 
precise regulatory framework; one was unfavorable to Indians and Congress simply 
overturned it. These, however, are the exceptions that prove the rule. Recent Con- 
gresses have shown little concerted interest in Indian affairs. See Newton, supra 
note 150, (describing and criticizing three recent legislative proposals). 
161. Just a few of the dozens of non-Indian law opinions denigrating "judicial 
legislation" in the past two decades include: Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 
147 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting); Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 
365, 397 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 
966 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring); Oklahoma City v. f i t t le ,  471 U.S. 808, 841-42 
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 48, 77-78 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Federal Election Comm'n 
v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 507 (1985) (White, 
J., dissenting); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 586 n.16 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 227 n.7 (1981) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 483-84 
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1978) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373-74 
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 709 (1975) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
The number of the above-cited opinions written by Justice Stevens is ironic in 
view of his leadership role in switching the Indian law presumptions in 1989 in a 
way inimical to both current congressional policy and to a long list of common-law 
precedent. 
